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STANDING TO SUE: LESSONS FROM 
SCOTLAND’S ACTIO POPULARIS 
JAMES E. PFANDER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Much of what we think we know about the nature of judicial power 
in the early Republic comes from the history of English common law. 
Our focus on the common law seems natural enough: Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England shaped many an antebellum 
lawyer’s notion of legal practice, and jurists in the twentieth century 
quite deliberately pointed to the courts at Westminster when discussing 
the origins of judicial power in America. 
  An emerging body of scholarship has come to question this single-
minded focus. Litigation in eighteenth-century America was an eclectic 
affair, also drawing on the practices of the courts of equity and 
admiralty, which relied on Romano-canonical alternatives to the 
common law writ system. Recognizing an inquisitorial role for judges 
and often relaxing strict adversary requirements in the issuance of 
investitive decrees, these courts registered legal claims and tested the 
boundaries of official authority. 
  This Article examines the rules of standing to sue that emerged from 
one important court’s reliance on civil law modes of practice. The 
Scottish Court of Session heard cases in both law and equity and, early 
on, developed a declaratory practice that allowed litigants to test their 
rights in a setting where no coercive judgment was contemplated. While 
in private litigation the Scots imposed standing limits—or what the 
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Court of Session referred to as title and interest to sue—they also 
permitted individuals to bring an actio popularis, or popular action, in 
certain circumstances. The Scottish actio popularis allowed individual 
suitors to press legal claims held in common with other members of the 
public. By offering an account of Scots practice, this Article illuminates 
a remarkably mature but long-ignored body of standing law. In doing 
so, it draws upon Scottish ideas to explore the origins of modern 
standing law in the United States, the viability of claims asserting 
generalized grievances, and the importance of representational 
adequacy and nonparty preclusion to a full understanding of public 
law litigation.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 1495 
I.  Standing in the Scottish Court of Session ..................................... 1507 
A. Scotland, the Court of Session, and Review of  
Government Action ........................................................... 1508 
1. The Practice of the Court of Session. ............................ 1508 
2. Central Government Oversight and the Declarator. ... 1511 
3. Local Government Oversight ........................................ 1514 
B. Standing Law in Scotland .................................................. 1516 
1. Title and Interest To Sue ................................................ 1516 
2. The Actio Popularis ....................................................... 1520 
3. The Problem of Preclusion ............................................ 1528 
C.  Roman Influence on Scots Law ....................................... 1531 
II.  The Lessons of Scots Standing Law ............................................. 1533 
A. Scots Standing Law: A Comparative Look ..................... 1535 
1. Title and Interest To Sue ................................................ 1535 
2. The Private/Public Distinction. ..................................... 1541 
3. Standing and Nonparty Preclusion ............................... 1547 
B. Scotland and Standing Law in the United States ........... 1554 
C. On the Need for a Threshold Body of Standing Law .... 1560 






PFANDER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:12 AM 
2017] STANDING TO SUE 1495 
[In assessing a litigant’s title and interest to sue, t]he interest of 
ambition, of revenge, or of any other passion that is not lucrative, is 
totally disregarded.   
—Henry Home, Lord Kames (1777)1 
[In evaluating taxpayer standing,] Wallet Injury is . . . concrete and 
particularized [but] Psychic Injury . . . consists of the taxpayer’s mental 
displeasure [and] “does not state an Article III case or controversy.” 
—Justice Antonin Scalia (2007)2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States characterizes itself as 
bound by the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the 
Constitution, a requirement it defines and justifies in part by reference 
to English legal history. Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter, an influential 
twentieth-century proponent of standing limits, invoked the English 
judicial system in explaining that the federal “[j]udicial power could 
come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of the 
courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert 
feel of lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”3 As elaborated 
over the ensuing decades, the case-or-controversy requirement has 
been said to encompass a range of familiar justiciability limits, 
including the idea that only plaintiffs with standing can invoke the 
judicial power4 and only in the context of a live dispute between 
 
 1. HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, ELUCIDATIONS RESPECTING THE COMMON AND 
STATUTE LAW OF SCOTLAND 214 (Edinburgh, W. Creech & T. Cadell 1777). 
 2. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619–20 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007)). 
 3. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 151 n.6 (7th ed. 2015) (characterizing Frankfurter’s “influential” opinion in 
Coleman v. Miller as one that has “framed subsequent analysis”). 
 4. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998) (concluding that 
citizen-suit plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge alleged violations of federal environmental 
statutes); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (denying standing in a citizen-suit 
claim against the federal government); cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760–61 (1984) 
(concluding that parents of African American schoolchildren lacked standing to compel the 
Internal Revenue Service to deny a tax exemption to racially discriminatory private schools). For 
a discussion of the particulars of the injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry, see Richard M. 
Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1194–95 (2014). Professor Richard Re quotes 
decisional law that requires the plaintiff’s injury to be “‘tangible,’ ‘specific,’ ‘present,’ 
‘perceptible,’ and ‘palpable.’” Id. 
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adverse parties.5 But the connection to England remains. Justice Scalia 
upheld qui tam litigation in part on the strength of historical analogy6 
and later invoked the practice of our “English ancestors” in the course 
of a spirited dissent from the exercise of judicial power in a context he 
viewed as insufficiently adversarial.7  
Scholars have debated the Court’s proffered historical 
justification for standing law. In an important set of papers that 
appeared just as public law litigation was gaining momentum,8 
Professors Louis Jaffe and Raoul Berger argued that the King’s Bench 
permitted “strangers”—those without a personal stake—to pursue 
such prerogative writs as mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari.9 In 
addition, scholars identified qui tam actions brought on behalf of the 
public by bounty-seeking informers and relators as exemplars of public 
law litigation that went forward in English and early American courts 
without an injured party at the helm.10 Many scholars agree that the 
 
 5. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“At bottom, ‘the gist of the question 
of standing’ is whether petitioners have ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))). 
 6. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775–78 (2000) 
(acknowledging the use of informer suits in eighteenth-century England, and in the federal courts 
of the early Republic, as a key factor in the Court’s finding that such proceedings were proper 
subjects of federal judicial cognizance). 
 7. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2699–700 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the agreement between Windsor and the government as to the constitutional invalidity of the 
federal law at issue deprived the Court of power to reach the merits); see also Ariz. State 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2694 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the “judicial [p]ower” with which the framers entrusted Article III courts “was the 
judicial power they were familiar with—that traditionally exercised by English and American 
courts”). 
 8. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1288–89 (1976) (tracing the rise of a distinctive form of litigation in public law matters). 
 9. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 
78 YALE L.J. 816, 819–21, 825 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public 
Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1274 (1961) [hereinafter Jaffe, Standing to Secure]; Louis L. 
Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1968) [hereinafter Jaffe, Citizen Litigant].  
 10. Scholars agree that England recognized informer and relator actions in which individuals 
sought relief on behalf of the Crown or the public. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of 
Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341–44 (1989) (tracing the history of qui tam litigation in 
England and the United States); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of 
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406–09 (1988) (discussing qui tam and informer suits, 
in which plaintiffs seek to recover a bounty rather than redress a personal injury); cf. Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 175–77 (1992) (arguing that qui tam litigation, such as that brought under the federal 
False Claims Act, disproves the injury-in-fact gloss on Article III standing). See generally Stevens, 
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Court’s case-or-controversy limits were a twentieth-century invention 
of the federal judiciary, rather than a recognized feature of nineteenth-
century conceptions of the judicial power.11  
More recent scholarship questions these conclusions,12 arguing 
that history does not defeat standing doctrine.13 Building on the 
distinction between public and private actions, Professors Ann 
Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson argue that nineteenth-century courts 
had imposed important limits on the ability of private individuals with 
no personal stake to appear on behalf of the public to litigate public 
harms.14 The tradition of qui tam litigation in this telling represents only 
a modest departure from the dominant view that matters of public right 
were to be handled by officials of the government.15 English law, 
particularly as restated in Blackstone’s Commentaries,16 figures 
prominently on both sides of these questions. 
 
529 U.S. at 773–75 (upholding, in part on historical grounds, the right of an informer to pursue 
claims for a penalty as the assignee of the government’s injury-in-fact). 
 11. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist 
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 458–59 (1996) (describing the rise of standing law in the 
twentieth century and attributing it to Justice Frankfurter’s efforts to protect the New Deal from 
excessive judicial oversight); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The 
Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 637–39 (1992) (similarly tracing the rise of standing 
law to the New Deal period); cf. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, 
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004 (2002) 
(describing the Court’s standing analysis as “a judicially invented gloss on the Constitution”). 
 12. For example, Brad Clanton argues that many of the so-called strangers involved in 
supervisory writ proceedings were actually interested parties. See Bradley S. Clanton, Standing 
and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1010 
(1997). 
 13. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004). 
 14. Thus, America early abandoned the English idea of private criminal prosecutions: the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 vested the prosecutorial power in officers of the executive branch of the 
federal government. Id. at 695–701; cf. Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: 
How Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong 
Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2249–50 (1999) (observing that government-initiated criminal 
prosecutions do not seek redress for an injury in fact). Mandamus practice evolved, at least in 
some states, to prevent private parties with no concrete interest from pursuing claims against 
public officials. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 709 (stating that as of 1834, the “general 
rule” of Massachusetts permitted a private individual to apply for a writ of mandamus “only in a 
case where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved” (quoting In re Wellington, 
1834 WL 2806, at *12 (Mass. Oct. 1, 1834))).  
 15. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 725–32 (describing such actions as relatively 
uncommon; as largely the product of a single statute; and as creating problems of arbitrary, 
oppressive, and duplicative enforcement). 
 16. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765). See, e.g., 
Clanton, supra note 12, at 1012–14 (invoking Blackstone); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, 
at 693 nn.13, 15 & 16, 695–96 nn.22–25, 700–01 (relying on Blackstone). 
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An emerging body of scholarship contests this single-minded 
focus on the law of England as the only source of insight into 
conceptions of the judicial power in the early Republic.17 Scholars have 
questioned the adversarial assumptions that inform traditional 
accounts of the nature of the judicial function in the United States;18 
they have argued that Romano-canonical modes of inquisitorial 
practice characterized a wide range of federal judicial proceedings;19 
they have argued that Scottish legal architecture, with its supreme 
Court of Session, may have provided one important model for the 
hierarchical structure of the federal judicial system;20 and they have 
challenged both the injury-in-fact and adverse-party elements of 
modern standing law.21 Efforts to recover a better understanding of the 
broad-gauged nature of America’s legal inheritance continue on many 
fronts.22 
Working within this expanded scholarly framework, this Article 
explores a surprisingly mature but wholly neglected body of standing 
law; that which governed practice in the eighteenth-century Scottish 
Court of Session. The Court of Session served as Scotland’s highest 
court in civil law matters, it exercised broad original and appellate 
 
 17. See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 24–29, 87–88, 120–24 (2010) (emphasizing Scottish influence on American 
constitutionalism). 
 18. On the importance of inquisitorial models in the early years of the Republic, see Amalia 
D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an 
Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1204–08 (2005). A good deal more has 
been written about the rise of adversary criminal procedure than of adversary civil procedure. 
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003); Stephan 
Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century 
England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 496, 499 (1990). 
 19. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1410–13 (2015) [hereinafter 
Pfander & Birk, Non-Contentious Jurisdiction] (describing a range of non-contentious features of 
legal practice in the early Republic and arguing more generally that such forms of practice were 
an understood feature of proceedings before equity, admiralty, and church courts). 
 20. See James E Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2011) [hereinafter Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary] (identifying the Scottish 
Court of Session as the supreme civil court of Scotland and as a possible model for the “one 
supreme Court” identified in Article III). 
 21. See Pfander & Birk, Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 1451–55 (observing 
that federal judicial power extends without any showing of injury to a wide range of applications 
to register claims of right in the context of non-contentious jurisdiction, such as claims to 
naturalized citizenship). 
 22. See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1053, 1106 (2010); see also Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, supra note 20, at 1631–42 (discussing 
the influence of Scottish ideas and authors in eighteenth-century America). 
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jurisdiction, and it presided over suits in law and equity.23 By the 
eighteenth century, the Court of Session had long entertained what we 
describe today as “public law” litigation24—that is, suits brought to 
declare and clarify the commonly held or public rights of individuals in 
cases in which government bodies appeared as interested parties.25  
The practice of the Court of Session thus offers an overlooked but 
potentially valuable source of historical and comparative insight into 
the law of standing that later came to define and constrain the work of 
courts in the United States. For starters, the Scots developed a set of 
rules that would govern the standing of parties in the ordinary course 
of private litigation. The Court of Session framed this standing inquiry 
in terms of the plaintiff’s (or pursuer’s) “title” and “interest” to sue.26 
To pursue a claim, plaintiffs were required to show that they had both 
an interest in the relief being sought and title to pursue the claim. Not 
everyone with an interest (or something to gain) could initiate an 
action; instead, Scots law limited access to those interested pursuers 
with title, a concept that restricted suit to those with a clear legal right 
to pursue the claim.27 As a general matter, then, Scots private law ruled 
out third-party standing for those seeking to enforce the rights of 
another party, or what the Scots called (following Roman law) jus 
tertii.28 
 
 23. On the origins and jurisdiction of the Court of Session, see infra Part I.A. 
 24. See Chayes, supra note 8, at 1302 (highlighting the more active, inquisitorial role of the 
judge in public law proceedings as compared to the more passive dispute-resolving role of the 
judge in private law litigation). On the key elements of public law litigation, see Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463–65 (1974). Steffel identifies federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, constitutional tort claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and officer suability under Ex 
parte Young as the cornerstones of modern public law litigation. Id.  
 25. See R.S., The Scotch Action of Declarator, 10 LAW MAG. 173, 194 (1859) (describing the 
Scots’ declarator and distinguishing Blackstone’s emphasis on the importance of adversaries from 
the Scottish ideas of John Erskine, who saw the need for a declaration of rights before they were 
denied or called into question). On the willingness of the Scots to allow private parties to 
interplead with the Crown, see J.D.B. Mitchell, The Royal Prerogative in Modern Scots Law, in 
PUBLIC LAW 304, 304 (J.A.G. Griffth ed., 1957). J.D.B. Mitchell traces the suability of the Crown 
in Scotland to legal developments in the 1540s. Id. Lord Kames characterized as an “established 
maxim, that the King, with whom the executive part of the law is trusted, has no part of the 
judicative power.” HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, HISTORICAL LAW TRACTS 308 (Edinburgh, 
Bell & Bradfute, 4th ed. 1792).  
 26. KAMES, supra note 1, at 213, 216. Modern sources largely echo Lord Kames in defining 
title and interest. See, e.g., MUNGO DEANS, SCOTS PUBLIC LAW 170 (1995) (describing title and 
interest to sue as common law principles synonymous with standing or locus standi). 
 27. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 28. KAMES, supra note 1, at 214. 
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Despite these ordinarily applicable standing limits, Scots law 
recognized an exception to the requirements of title and interest when 
the pursuer brought a “popular action,” or what the Scots referred to 
(following Roman law) as an actio popularis. The actio popularis 
authorized any person to pursue a claim on behalf of the public in cases 
in which a public delict or wrong might otherwise go unredressed.29 The 
Scots version of the actio popularis empowered an individual (a 
pursuer) to mount a claim for relief, often an action for a declaratory 
judgment, when the defendant (a defender, which was often a public 
body) had impinged on rights held in common by a variety of 
individuals.30 None of the pursuers had a clear title to sue in cases of 
such widespread and somewhat diffuse injury, yet the Court of Session 
formulated rules enabling one or more of them to pursue the claim in 
order to avoid a defect of justice. The conception of the Court of 
Session as a court of equity, exercising powers of nobile officium (the 
power to hear claims of injustice in the last resort when other remedies 
prove inadequate), played a prominent role in justifying such actio 
popularis proceedings in the eighteenth century.31 Indeed, in working 
 
 29. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 30. As one early twentieth-century source notes: 
Members of the public, or members of particular sections of the public, have in certain 
cases a right to sue actions as such. An action brought by a pursuer in his capacity as a 
member of the public is known as an actio popularis, and such action is available for 
the vindication or defence of a public right. Thus any member of the public has a title 
to sue for declarator of a public right of way, a right of market, a declarator that the 
navigation of a public navigable river should not be obstructed, a declarator of common 
use and enjoyment by the public of a piece of land, for removal of a public danger, or 
nuisance, or to prevent the building of a bridge across a public street by proprietors on 
opposite sides of the street, and the like. 
1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 85–86 (John L. Wark & A.C. Black eds., 1926) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 31. The Court of Session took an extremely broad view of its nobile officium, or equitable 
power, to depart from the strict mandates of the law and proceed according to what it considered 
“just[] and fit.” GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 233–34 
(London, A. Bell & J. Luntley 1694) [hereinafter MACKENZIE, 1694]. Nobile officium came into 
play in cases in which “the Law behoved to trust the Discretion and Honesty of the Judge, since 
all Cases could not be comprehended under known Laws.” GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 201 (Edinburgh, Watson, 4th ed. 1706) [hereinafter 
MACKENZIE, 1706]. In cases in which law did not provide an established remedy or was otherwise 
inadequate, the Court of Session had “recourse from strict law to equity, even in the matter of 
judgment; and in more cases they may recede from the ordinary form and manner of probation, 
whereof there are many instances commonly known.” JAMES DALRYMPLE, THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 570 (Edinburgh, G. Hamilton & J. Balfour, 3d ed. 1759). Nobile 
officium was exclusive to the Court of Session, id., having been conferred by the king’s injunction 
that the Court was to “examine, conclude, and finally determine all and sundry complaints, causes 
and quarrels that may be determined before the King and his Council,” id. at 546; see also KAMES, 
supra note 25, at 232 (declaring that the nobile officium authority of the Court of Session came 
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to prevent a failure of justice, the Court of Session seems to have 
recognized that the rules of standing applicable to private litigation 
must give way to allow public actions to proceed. 
Scots law paid particular attention to the rights of both pursuers 
and defenders. The insistence on title and interest to sue was framed 
less as a restriction on the power of the Court of Session itself than as 
an important protection for the rights of defenders.32 The Scots 
understood that a variety of parties could have an interest in pursuing 
public actions. The Court of Session thus sought to forestall the 
potential unfairness that would result to defenders if forced to defend 
a series of lawsuits seeking essentially the same relief. In private 
litigation, title and interest to sue served to identify a pursuer well 
positioned to assert the claim in question. By according qualified res 
judicata effect to that disposition, the Court of Session could limit the 
number of contests and provide a measure of repose for defenders.33 In 
cases where no single pursuer could be said to enjoy clear title to sue, 
as with an actio popularis proceeding, the Court of Session sought a 
middle way that would facilitate a test of legality and afford defenders 
some relief from seriatim litigation.34 
Interesting in their own right as illustrations of Roman and civil 
law approaches to the problem of standing doctrine, these features of 
Scots practice also offer historical and comparative lessons to students 
of justiciability law in the United States. The Scottish insistence on title 
and interest to sue in private actions provides an early precursor and 
obvious analog to the law of standing as it later developed in the courts 
of the United States. It thus offers some support for those who argue 
that standing limits were embodied in eighteenth-century conceptions 
 
from a grant from the Crown). For a modern account of the origins and current application of the 
nobile officium, see STEPHEN THOMSON, THE NOBILE OFFICIUM: THE EXTRAORDINARY 
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF SCOTLAND 6–17 (2015). Thomson 
reviews historical accounts of the origins of what he describes as an equitable jurisdiction and 
attributes it partly to the court’s broad supervisory powers and partly to its assumption of powers 
previously exercised by the privy council. Id. 
 32. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 33. In Scotland, res judicata was broadly defined as follows:  
The question as to what sentences possess the character of res judicata is frequently 
one of great nicety, but it may be stated broadly at the outset that the requisites of a 
plea of res judicata are (a) a proper previous determination of the subject in question; 
(b) the parties to the second cause must be identical with, or representative of, the 
parties to the first cause, or have the same interests; (c) the subject-matter of the two 
actions must be the same; and (d) there must be identity of grounds of action in law or 
in fact. 
12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, supra note 33, at 550.  
 34. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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of the judicial power. Yet, Scots practice accepted the propriety of 
public actions in some circumstances. Recognition of the Roman actio 
popularis provides an intriguing exception to the principle that 
pursuers must show both title and interest to sue. While the Court of 
Session did not conceptualize the proceedings as what we moderns 
describe as “generalized grievances,”35 the Scots incorporation of 
Roman law lends a measure of universality to the argument for some 
relaxation of strict standing rules in public actions. Courts of equity, 
acting in the last resort, feel some pressure to interpose against public 
injustice.  
Although discussions of international litigation occasionally refer 
to the Roman-law construct of the actio popularis,36 it has played 
essentially no role in assessments of the historical foundations of 
standing law in the United States.37 Perhaps an outgrowth of the 
Supreme Court’s own emphasis on practice in the English courts at 
Westminster, this gap in the literature leaves part of the history of 
standing untold. After all, the world in which the lawyers of the 
founding generation read and practiced law extended well beyond 
Westminster to the civil law-inflected practice of the ecclesiastical 
courts and the courts of admiralty.38 Like the Court of Session, these 
courts featured Romano-canonical modes of practice and employed 
 
 35. This term first turned up in an unlikely setting. In the course of approving a limited form 
of taxpayer standing, the Supreme Court disclaimed the notion that it was thereby encouraging 
the litigation of generalized grievances. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968); cf. HCJ 910/86 
Ressler v. Ministry of Defence 42(2) PD 441, 442 (1988) (Isr.) (translation available at http://versa.
cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/ressler-v-minister-defence [https://perma.cc/7Y24-SCQM]) (suggesting 
that, in the course of approving a broad conception of standing, the High Court of Justice was 
nonetheless stopping short of accepting the actio popularis). Although it began as a rhetorical 
flourish, the ban on generalized grievances has reportedly evolved into a constitutional limit on 
judicial power. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 
(2014).  
 36. For references to actio popularis in discussions of international human rights law, see 
generally William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 353; Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes, 35 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 265 (2001); Egon Schwelb, The Actio Popularis and International Law, 2 ISR. 
Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 46 (1972). Cf. S.M. THIO, LOCUS STANDI AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–5 (1971) 
(distinguishing private litigation to vindicate a personal interest or claim from a public action or 
actio popularis, which cements the judiciary’s role in vindicating the general interest of the public 
in the legality of legislative and administrative action). 
 37. One searches in vain for a discussion of the actio popularis in the literature on standing 
and the history of Article III. 
 38. See Pfander & Birk, Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 1414–16. 
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attorneys (or proctors) who were educated in civil law.39 To portray 
Founding-era conceptions of the adjudicative process, one must 
include both the bold colors of the common law and the shades and 
contrasts supplied by practice in the civilian courts and the Scottish 
Court of Session.40 Indeed, English common law practice in qui tam 
litigation may owe an undertheorized debt to the forms and modes of 
the civilians.41  
Apart from filling out our understanding of the Founding era’s 
legal inheritance, Scots law may offer comparative lessons. Much has 
been said in the United States about whether to make the standing 
inquiry part of an evaluation of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim or to 
preserve it as a threshold inquiry separate from the merits.42 Indeed, 
one can understand the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.43 as a partial 
vindication of the suggested integration of the two inquiries.44 The 
 
 39. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 169–72 (4th ed. 
2002) (describing the university education of civil lawyers, practicing in the courts of admiralty at 
Doctor’s Commons); cf. 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d. ed. 
1922) (describing the education of the common lawyers at the Inns of Court). 
 40. American lawyer Nathan Dane followed Blackstone in defining the civil law as the 
“municipal law of the Roman empire, as comprised in the Institutes, the Code, and the Digests of 
the emperor Justinian.” 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF 
AMERICAN LAW 377 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823). Dane included admiralty courts 
and ecclesiastical courts as among those that followed Roman law. Id. at 376–77. 
 41. As noted above, the medieval tradition of informer and qui tam litigation in England has 
figured prominently in scholarly debates over the legitimacy of standing limits in the United 
States. See supra note 10. That tradition may have its roots in Roman law. Indeed, Blackstone 
describes the proceedings in question as “popular actions,” implying that he perceived a 
connection to Roman precursors. Blackstone explained, “But, more usually, these forfeitures 
created by statute are given at large, to any common informer; or, in other words, to any such 
person or persons as will sue for the same: and hence such actions are called popular actions, 
because they are given to the people in general.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *161. 
Blackstone also drew on Roman law in concluding that priority attached to the first such action 
brought and that the judgment in such an action was a bar to subsequent proceedings for the same 
wrong. See id. at *162 (explaining the system of priority and identifying Roman law as the basis 
for England’s practice of denying preclusive effect to collusive popular action proceedings). See 
generally J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Litigation, 
78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 566 n.124 (2000) (tracing the origins of the informer action to Roman law). 
 42. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) 
(arguing against the use of standing doctrine as a threshold inquiry separate from the merits). See 
also Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (2013) 
(embracing and celebrating Fletcher’s suggestion). 
 43. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 44. See id. at 1387 (recharacterizing the zone-of-interests inquiry as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, casting doubt on the viability of prudential standing doctrines, and suggesting that 
standing limits must be grounded in either constitutional or statutory interpretation). Although 
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Scots conducted a threshold standing inquiry that was independent 
from the merits determination.45 Under the Scots law of res judicata, a 
dismissal for lack of title and interest was not viewed as an adjudication 
of the merits of the underlying claim and thus left other interested 
litigants free to pursue the claim. Students of standing law in the United 
States may learn a thing or two from the Scots’ attention to rules of 
preclusion.46 
Practice in Scotland may also enrich debates over the timing of 
standing’s emergence in the courts of the United States. Scholars 
generally agree that standing law took root in the decisional law of the 
Supreme Court sometime during the 1920s and 1930s.47 In explaining 
the rise of standing law, some accounts emphasize progressive politics 
and the rise of the administrative state.48 Professor A.J. Bellia argues, 
somewhat by way of contrast, that the joinder of law and equity and 
the recognition of a single form of action under the 1938 Federal Rules 
 
at one time the prudential standing doctrine operated as a jurisdictional limit, the now-
reconfigured zone-of-interests analysis goes to the statute’s interpretation and to the legal 
viability of the plaintiff’s claim on the merits. See id. at 1387 n.4 (distinguishing questions of the 
validity of a cause of action on the merits, a matter controlled by the statute, from the 
jurisdictional inquiry into the power of the court to adjudicate). 
 45. To forestall seriatim litigation, the Court of Session ascribed preclusive effect to the first 
merits disposition reached in an action brought by a party with title and interest to sue. Two 
corollaries followed. First, defenders could invoke res judicata as a bar to a second proceeding 
only when an unsuccessful first action had been brought by a party with title and interest to sue. 
See infra Part I.B.3. Second, defenders could seek dismissal of the first proceeding if they were 
being prosecuted by parties who lacked title and interest to sue; otherwise, defenders would face 
the prospect of a second or successive proceeding brought by the “entitled” party. See infra Part 
I.B.1. 
 46. Scholars in the United States have begun to attend more closely to preclusion law. See 
Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 643–44 
(2015) (recognizing that an action brought by a plaintiff on behalf of the government may bar 
subsequence government litigation). 
 47. See Winter, supra note 10, at 1375–76, 1450–52 (describing a 1922 decision by Justice 
Brandeis as the first modern standing decision but tracing the birth of standing to the subsequent 
work of Justice Frankfurter in such cases as Coleman and Joint Anti-Fascist League); see also 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal 
Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 452–57 (1994) (tracing the rise of standing and other 
justiciability doctrines in the twentieth century); Winter, supra note 10, at 1455–57 (describing the 
rise of standing law as the result of a concerted effort by liberal Justices to avoid substantive due 
process claims). 
 48. See Fletcher, supra note 42, at 225–28 (arguing that standing law began after 1923, with 
the rise of the administrative state and the growth in public law litigation to articulate 
constitutional values); Pushaw, supra note 11, at 458–63 (assigning Justice Frankfurter 
responsibility for transforming standing law into a constitutional limit); Maxwell L. Stearns, 
Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 350 (1995) (tracing 
justiciability limits to the New Deal period and the full emergence of standing doctrine to 
developments during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts). 
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of Civil Procedure may explain why federal courts were obliged to 
fashion standing-law limits.49 Such limits would, on Bellia’s account, do 
the work once performed by common law pleading forms.50 By 
emphasizing the importance of articulating judicial limits on an 
otherwise far-reaching equitable power to declare the law, the Scots 
experience extends Bellia’s account by identifying factors that may 
have led to the rise of standing law in the United States before 1938.  
Two changes in particular brought practice in the United States 
more closely into line with that in Scotland: the 1908 judicial 
recognition in Ex parte Young51 of a party’s right to enjoin threatened 
state violations of the federal Constitution and the 1875 legislative 
conferral of general federal question jurisdiction on the federal 
judiciary, the foundation for such litigation.52 By enabling new forms of 
equitable interposition, these developments freed the federal courts to 
some extent from the common law writ, code, and equitable pleading 
systems and the limits such pleading systems had necessarily imposed 
on the right of plaintiffs to pursue judicial remedies.53 Both 
developments were in place by the early twentieth century, thereby 
 
 49. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 825–
26 (2004) (“Most forms of proceeding and writs were unavailable to persons who had suffered no 
injury in fact from a legal violation. Other forms of proceedings and writs may have been available 
to non-injured-in-fact persons in certain circumstances, but at most to the limited extent that that 
form of proceeding or writ was available to anyone.”); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–68 (1973) (identifying the private 
rights model as a precursor to standing law); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 693–94 
(emphasizing the primacy of the private litigation model as the measure of standing law). 
 50. See Bellia, supra note 49, at 828 (arguing that standing represents an attempt to distill 
certain limits from pre-rules-based forms of proceedings on the otherwise unbridled “one form of 
action” in the federal rules). 
 51. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 52. See generally id. (recognizing the right of an individual or firm to seek federal injunctive 
relief against a state official’s threatened violation of a federal constitutional right). Congress 
conferred a general grant of federal question jurisdiction in 1875, authorizing the lower federal 
courts to hear “cases arising under” the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. See 
Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335–37; FALLON, supra note 3, at 781–82. By 1934, a third element 
had joined the earlier two: the Declaratory Judgment Act became law, in part through the 
advocacy of Edwin Borchard, who specifically invoked the Scottish experience in urging its 
adoption in the United States. See generally Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment: A 
Needed Procedural Reform, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918) (tracing the Scottish declaratory-judgment 
proceeding to precursors in French and Roman law and noting its adoption in England in 1852). 
For the current text of the Declaratory Judgment Act, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012). See 
generally FALLON, supra note 3, at 837–38 (offering a brief history of declaratory litigation in the 
United States). 
 53. For an explanation of Ex parte Young’s departure from existing models of equitable 
interposition, see James E. Pfander & Jessica Dwinnell, A Declaratory Theory of State 
Accountability, 102 VA. L. REV. 153, 214 & n.237 (2016). 
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setting the stage for the broad assertion of constitutional claims that 
prefigured the Court’s use of standing as a restriction on access to 
judicial review. Well known as a general matter, these two 
developments may deserve a more prominent place in discussions of 
the rise of standing law in the courts of the United States.54 
In suggesting that Scots standing law may offer comparative and 
historical insights into practice in today’s federal courts, this Article 
makes no claim that Scots law was directly transplanted into American 
practice or that it decisively shaped the original understanding or 
meaning of Article III of the Constitution. Although Lord Kames, one 
of the eighteenth century’s best-known judges of the Scottish Court of 
Session, was known to have argued for joinder of law and equity, and 
although admiralty law relied on Romano-canonical forms of practice, 
I have found little indication that the courts of the early Republic 
routinely turned to Scots law to define judicial practice.55 Indeed, state 
reception statutes often called for the application of English common 
law as the rule of decision, except where incompatible with local 
circumstances.56 Scots law thus had less impact on the workaday world 
of the lawyers of the early Republic than did the ubiquitous 
Commentaries of Blackstone.57 Nonetheless, members of the Founding 
era were surely familiar with the Court of Session and Kames’s 
capacious conception of the nobile officium.58 Kames himself viewed 
Scots and English law as bearing a sufficient “resemblance” to warrant 
useful comparative study, reckoning that the differences would help to 
“illustrate each other by their opposition.”59  
 
 54. See infra Part II.B. 
 55. Indeed, the Process Act of 1789 called for the lower federal courts to apply in suits at 
common law the procedural rules of the states in which they were established and to apply the 
rules of “civil law” in suits in admiralty, maritime, and equity jurisdiction. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, 
JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 509–37 (1971) (describing the 
evolution of the Process Act).  
 56. See generally Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United 
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951) (describing the history of reception statutes). In this respect, 
reception statutes simply carried forward a practice of reliance on English sources that began 
during colonial times. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 731, 767 n.180 (2010). 
 57. See Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, supra note 20, at 1627–31. 
 58. An originalist-minded colleague has suggested to me that one might treat Scots law as an 
illustration of what the Constitution’s framers would have expected had they been asked to 
imagine public law litigation of the kind that modern standing law seeks to moderate. Cf. Missouri 
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (expressing doubt that even the most “gifted” of the 
“begetters” could have foreseen the constitutional developments of the twentieth century). 
 59. KAMES, supra note 25, at xii. 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I sketches Scottish 
standing law in the eighteenth century, from title and interest to sue in 
private litigation to the Roman-law actio popularis that governed 
public actions. Part II compares Scots standing law with the law that 
began to take hold in early-twentieth-century America, identifying 
surprising areas of overlap, affinity, and fruitful comparison. While the 
Scots were not attempting to solve modern problems, their approach 
places our own debate over the origins and legitimacy of standing law 
into a historical context that may facilitate a somewhat more 
dispassionate analysis. A brief conclusion suggests that we can learn 
both from what Scots law says about the law of standing and from what 
the relative invisibility of the Roman actio popularis says about the 
Anglo-centricity of our discussions of Founding-era conceptions of the 
judicial power.  
I.  STANDING IN THE SCOTTISH COURT OF SESSION 
As a prelude to an assessment of the standing law of Scotland, this 
Part begins with a brief overview of Scottish institutions and a 
description of the structure of the Scottish court system and the Court 
of Session. In next describing the eighteenth-century Scots law of 
standing, this Part focuses on the way leading treatises of the period 
described the requirements of title and interest to sue and the right of 
individuals to pursue an actio popularis. The descriptions come from 
sources that circulated as the common currency of well-read lawyers of 
the period, such as Kames’s Historical Law Tracts and other works of 
Scotland’s leading institutional writers.60 This Part also canvasses some 
of the decisional law of the period. 
It is worth posing a question at the outset. Scotland was apparently 
alone among English-speaking countries in imposing an explicit 
threshold standing requirement in the eighteenth century. In contrast 
to Scottish experience, the English reportedly had no comparable 
doctrine. Although he combed through the English reports with some 
care, Jaffe reported that he “encountered no case before 1807” in 
which the “standing of the plaintiff is mooted.”61 Similarly, scholars 
 
 60. For background on Scots law sources and the way Scottish law books and ideas came to 
influence British North America in the eighteenth century, see Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, 
supra note 20, at 1631–42. In explicating Scots law of the eighteenth century, this Article relies 
primarily on law books that were available to American lawyers. 
 61. Jaffe, Standing to Secure, supra note 9, at 1270. I have found occasional references to title 
and interest to sue in English and American works on early-nineteenth-century practice in courts 
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tend to agree that the early American cases fail to articulate a formal 
body of threshold standing law, although some report evidence of 
standing-like concerns by the nineteenth century. Indeed, most 
American scholars trace the rise of standing law to the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, just as English decisions began to take 
standing questions more seriously in the 1890s.62 What led the Scots to 
confront and resolve issues of standing several decades before their 
cousins to the south and west? 
A. Scotland, the Court of Session, and Review of Government Action 
1. The Practice of the Court of Session.  Building on fifteenth-
century precursors,63 the Scots Parliament created the Court of Session 
in 1532.64 Session’s jurisdiction extended to a range of original 
proceedings and included the power to review the decisions of such 
inferior tribunals as the sheriffs courts, the justices of the peace, and 
 
of equity. See, e.g., JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 126 (James Kent ed., New York, McDermit & D.D. Arden, 1816) 
(treating letters of administration as essential to confer title to sue in the context of estate 
administration). Closer study may reveal more such references in early equity reports. 
 62. Jaffe, Standing to Secure, supra note 9, at 1271–72. 
 63. The Scottish Parliament created a supreme court in 1426 consisting of a council of the 
royal Chancellor and nine other persons chosen to “determine complaints and causes.” DAVID 
M. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SCOTS LAW 
133–34 (8th ed. 2001). Over the course of the fifteenth century, the court continued in various 
forms, attending to both civil and criminal matters and various forms of appeals. Id. at 135–36. 
See generally John W. Cairns, Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice, 52 STAIR SOC’Y 
27 (2006) (describing the foundation of the College of Justice in King James’s reign). 
 64. In 1532, Parliament established the College of Justice (also known as the Court of 
Session) as a permanent body, evenly split between lay lawyers and clerics. MICHAEL C. MESTON, 
W.D.H. SELLAR & LORD COOPER, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL TRADITION 43–44 (1991). Parliament 
authorized the Chancellor, if present, to “occupy the presidential chair.” WALKER, supra note 63, 
at 137. The Court of Session “exercised a supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts 
and . . . jurisdiction in heritage, formerly reserved for feudal courts.” Id. at 138. In 1672, 
Parliament established the High Court of Justiciary as the supreme court for criminal matters. Id. 
at 147. The Scots court system was preserved by the Acts of Union of 1707, which formally united 
Scotland and England into Great Britain and ended, at least for a time, the Scottish Parliament. 
Id. at 154–55. The Acts of Union afforded British-style constitutional protections to the Court of 
Session, confirming its supremacy in relation to lower courts in Scotland and clarifying that its 
decisions were not subject to review by the English courts at Westminster. Id. at 155. Following 
the union, the House of Lords began hearing appeals from the Court of Session. Id. at 158. For 
more on the possible influence of the Court of Session and Acts of Union on the structure of 
Article III of the Constitution of the United States, see generally Pfander & Birk, Scottish 
Judiciary, supra note 20. On the reinstatement of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 in response to 
pressure for devolution, see generally Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in 
the United Kingdom, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 543 (2014).  
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the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts.65 Though forms of supervisory 
review varied, the Court of Session often deployed homegrown 
remedies such as reduction, advocation, and suspension to maintain 
uniformity of decision and correct errors in lower courts. As Kames 
described these modes of review, they operated something like the 
English prerogative writs.66 With an advocation, the court removed 
actions from lower courts for decision by a higher tribunal (often itself) 
in somewhat the same way that King’s Bench in England would remove 
matters from lower courts through the writ of certiorari.67 Reduction 
and suspension resembled the English writ of prohibition; a reduction 
would set aside the decree of a lower court while a suspension would 
prevent the execution of a decree during the pendency of review.68 
Three features of the Court of Session’s practice in the eighteenth 
century deserve special attention. First, the court viewed itself as a 
court of equity, available to hear claims of injustice in the last resort 
when other remedies proved inadequate—a power known as nobile 
officium.69 Second, the court was broadly responsible for public 
administrative law and was generally available to hear claims against 
 
 65. See Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, supra note 20, at 1653–56. The breadth of the 
Court of Session’s jurisdiction created serious docket concerns by the late eighteenth century, 
compounded by the practice of leaving issues open to seemingly endless motions for 
reconsideration through reclaiming petitions. See Nicholas Phillipson, Litigation in the Court of 
Session in the Later Eighteenth Century, 37 STAIR SOC’Y 42, 46, 60–61 (1990) (noting that the 
volume of litigation increased “phenomenally” in the eighteenth century and that the court gained 
a reputation, especially among merchants, for its inability to deliver speedy justice). 
 66. For more on the life of Kames, his service on the Court of Session, and his contributions 
to the Scottish enlightenment, see IAN SIMPSON ROSS, LORD KAMES AND THE SCOTLAND OF HIS 
DAY (1972); DAVID M. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH JURISTS 220–47 (1985). For more on the English 
prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto, see generally James E. 
Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 643 (2009). 
 67. See Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, supra note 20, at 1654. 
 68. See 2 ROBERT BELL, A DICTIONARY OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 660 (Edinburgh, J. 
Anderson 1808) (“The reduction is a rescissory action, by which deeds, services, decrees, or illegal 
acts by any body corporate may be rendered void.”). The Scots also borrowed some features of 
the writ system from England, but did not follow them slavishly. See WALKER, supra note 63, at 
125 (“English forms were, however, often discarded or modified and Scotland had fewer and more 
adaptable basic writs than the great multiplication of writs in the English register.”). 
 69. See KAMES, supra note 1, at 232 (linking the Court of Session’s powers of nobile officium 
to the demise of privy council). For a sharp critique of Kames and his vision of the court as one 
with broad equitable powers, see GILBERT STUART, OBSERVATIONS ON PUBLIC LAW AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SCOTLAND 268–69 (Edinburgh, W. Creech 1779). Gilbert Stuart described the 
Court of Session and its nobile officium not as a “right” but as a “deformity” and decried the 
court’s exercise of equitable discretion as a “usurp[ation]” of the legislative power. Id. 
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both local and national government officials.70 Third, it developed the 
power to issue a declarator—what Americans now refer to as a 
declaratory judgment.71 The declarator was available in both public 
and private litigation, but it proved especially useful in connection with 
actions to contest government authority. In such proceedings, the court 
would refuse to enjoin or interdict government action but was quite 
willing to declare the meaning of the applicable law and rely on 
government officials to carry its decrees into effect.72 
Although Scots law owed much to civil law precursors, it had 
evolved as a distinct body of law by the eighteenth century.73 Young 
 
 70. The Court of Session refused to recognize a doctrine of Crown immunity. See 2 LORD 
BANKTON, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, bk. IV, at 602 (Edinburgh, R. Fleming 1751) 
(“All persons, even those in authority, may be pursued with us, without exception of the king, but 
then the officers of the state are only called, they being bound to answer for his majesty.”); T.B. 
SMITH, BRITISH JUSTICE: THE SCOTTISH CONTRIBUTION 190 (1961) (explaining the absence of 
Crown immunity and identifying early exemplars of suits against the king’s ministers); see also 
Lord Murray, Rex Non Potest Peccare, 55 SCOT. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (1939) (describing the practice of 
allowing officers of state to sue and be sued for the Crown in matters in which the government 
was interested, and distinguishing Scots practice from that in England). One commentator reports 
that, prior to 1707, the English maxim, “the King can do no wrong” had not even appeared in 
Scots law. Instead, “early Scots’ statements of the right to convene the Crown as defender 
appear[ed] to set no such limit upon the general competency of [such] actions.” J.R. Philip, The 
Crown as Litigant in Scotland, 40 JURID. REV. 238, 246 (1928). In particular, the Court of Session 
“did not treat the Crown as immune from actions founded on delict or negligence.” Id. at 248. For 
more on the Court of Session’s role in relation to local government, see ROBERT BELL, TREATISE 
ON THE ELECTION LAWS AS THEY RELATE TO THE REPRESENTATION OF SCOTLAND IN THE 
PARLIAMENT OF UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 475–94 (1812). 
 71. C.L.G., Constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act as Affected by the Scope of 
Judicial Functions, 11 VA. L. REV. 473, 474 (1925) (underscoring that the “action of declarator 
had existed [in Scotland] for hundreds of years”); see also SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, 
MEMORANDUM NO. 14: REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.1, http://www.scotlawcom.gov.
uk/files/4113/1357/8645/cm14.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV9F-BPA3] (noting that “the declarator is 
one of the oldest Scottish remedies [and] is of very broad scope throughout the law”). 
 72. On the refusal of the Court of Session to direct an interdict (a negative injunction) at the 
government, see Adam Tompkins, The Crown in Scots Law, in PUBLIC LAW IN SCOTLAND 262, 
272–73 (Aileen McHarg & Tom Mullen eds., 2006). See also Magistrates of Rothsay v. Officers of 
State, n.45, 22 June 1820, in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSION 155 (J.A. Wilson et al. eds., 
Edinburgh, Manner & Miller, 1821) (reviewing a suit brought against the “officers of the state” 
which sought a declaration indicating that a local community retained, under a 1681 law, a 
maritime jurisdiction otherwise vested in the national admiralty court).  
 73. See generally Borchard, supra note 52 (describing the Roman and French civil law origins 
of the Scottish action of declarator). Scots procedure drew on civil law forms. See 5 DAVID M. 
WALKER, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SCOTLAND: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 593–95 (1998) 
(describing the libel, summons, and litiscontestation as cornerstones of Scottish civil procedure). 
But in formulating rules of decision, the Court of Session emphasized the leading treatise and its 
own past decisions and often downplayed Roman law. Cf. WALKER, supra note 63, at 337–41 
(noting the infrequency of references to Roman law in resolving current disputes). Professor 
Ewald attributes the influence of the civil law in Scotland to the Scots’ “auld alliance” with France 
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Scots lawyers were often educated in civil law at continental 
universities,74 Scotland’s conception of legal authority treated case 
decisions both as evidence of customary law and as binding authority,75 
treatises followed the institutional tradition of the civil law,76 and the 
great institutional writers (Lord Bankton and John Erskine in the 
eighteenth century) were viewed as authoritative in their statements of 
the law.77 As perhaps befits a civil law nation, Scotland did not always 
attend to the publication of its judicial decisions with quite the same 
care as England.78 Often the reports of the decisions of the Court of 
Session set out the facts and arguments of the parties and paid scant 
attention to the rationale of the decision.79 Advocates and judges would 
reason from first principles, as restated by the institutional writers, and 
from the precedents set by earlier decisions.80 
2. Central Government Oversight and the Declarator.  With some 
background in place, this section briefly reviews the role of the Court 
of Session in assessing the legality of central-government action, 
something that we associate today with administrative law. One can see 
 
(against England) and their reliance on continental universities to train lawyers in canon law. See 
Ewald, supra note 22, at 1073–75 (concluding that Scots’ reliance on civil law made Scots law more 
technically sophisticated than England’s). For an account, see generally Phillipson, supra note 65.  
 74. See WALKER, supra note 73, at 374–75 (describing leading figures of the Scots bar as 
having studied at Utrecht, Leiden, and Groningen); Ewald, supra note 22, at 1098–1100 
(emphasizing the prevalence of continental legal education for aspiring Scots lawyers). 
 75. See WALKER, supra note 73, at 338 (noting the importance of adherence to prior 
decisions).  
 76. On the institutional tradition in Scotland, see Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, supra 
note 20, at 1637–42. 
 77. See WALKER, supra note 73, at 351–52 (describing the influence of Bankton and 
Erskine). See generally Kenneth G.C. Reid, John Erskine and the Institute of the Law of Scotland 
(University of Edinburgh Sch. of Law Research Paper Series No. 2015/26, 2015) (describing 
Erskine’s An Institute of the Law of Scotland as the “most important work on Scots’ law of the 
eighteenth century”).  
 78. See R.S., supra note 25, at 179 (noting the prejudices of Scottish judges against the public 
reporting of their opinions); see also Phillipson, supra note 65, at 53 (observing that, because 
judges were not obliged to explain their votes and there was no means of reporting the opinions 
of the judges who chose to state them, unsuccessful litigants could be left to wonder why they had 
lost). 
 79. Walker credits Dalrymple with publishing the first set of reports that summarize the 
judges’ opinions. See WALKER, supra note 73, at 391. Earlier reporters frequently made mistakes 
and failed to publish their volumes on time. See id. at 435–38 (describing the travails of reporters 
and authorized collections of decisions from the period as tardy and defective).  
 80. See Ewald, supra note 22, at 1109–13 (describing the influence of Scottish education on 
the mind of James Wilson). 
PFANDER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:12 AM 
1512  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1493 
the court’s approach in Hopeton v. Officers of State,81 a 1750 decision 
that nicely illustrates the Court of Session’s use of the declarator 
action. Private parties brought such actions to clarify their legal rights 
in relation to the government, unembarrassed by any doctrine of 
sovereign immunity that would limit the lawsaying power of the court. 
After sketching Hopeton, this section steps back to consider the 
elements of the Hopeton decision and what they tell us about Scots law. 
During the economic boom of the eighteenth century, growing 
demand for coal, lead, and other valuable minerals led Scottish 
landowners to expand commercial mining operations.82 But there was 
a potential problem: at least in theory, the Crown’s prerogative 
extended to the ownership of all such below-ground minerals. To 
commence mining operations, prudent landowners were obliged to 
secure a grant that conveyed the Crown’s prerogative mining interest 
to them. Legislation adopted in 1592 authorized the Crown “to make 
such grants,” but one may have wondered about the vitality and self-
enforcing quality of such legislation after the passage of nearly two 
centuries and the union with England. 
Apparently concerned with just such uncertainties, the Earl of 
Hopeton, acting in his personal capacity, sought to establish his right 
to extract the minerals from his property. He first applied to the 
treasury department for a grant of mines and minerals within his lands. 
The commissioners of the treasury, in turn, referred his application to 
the Barons of the Exchequer, the judges of the court charged with the 
management of the Crown’s proprietary interests and tax revenue. The 
barons offered little clarity: they simply reported in the words of the 
1592 legislation that “it is lawful to his Majesty to make such a grant,” 
suggesting that any rights to the mines and minerals had already been 
conveyed.83 The earl was not satisfied; the barons had told him that he 
owned what he owned but had failed to clarify the extent of his right to 
extract minerals from his property. 
The earl, accordingly, brought an action for a declarator before 
the Court of Session. He named the “officers of state” as defenders and 
 
 81. Hopeton v. Officers of State (1750) ScotCS, in 31 WILLIAM MAXWELL MORISON, THE 
DECISIONS OF THE COURT SESSION FROM ITS INSTITUTION UNTIL THE SEPARATION OF COURT 
INTO TWO DIVISIONS IN THE YEAR 1808, DIGESTED PROPER HEADS, IN THE FORM OF A 
DICTIONARY 13,527 (1811). 
 82. See WALKER, supra note 73, at 63–70 (describing a gradual shift from agriculture to an 
economy that featured mining and manufacturing). 
 83. See Hopeton, in 31 MORISON, supra note 81, at 13,527. 
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argued, again, that he had a right to the grant.84 The defenders did not 
deny the earl’s right, but simply argued that it was improper to bring 
an action. According to the defenders, such actions would lie only if 
the pursuer’s claim of right was denied. Here, the right was admitted, 
depriving the proceeding of the necessary stuff of litigation. There was, 
according to the defenders, no “wrong done” or “right withheld” and 
no justification for the court’s intervention.85 
The Court of Session disagreed with this defense and provided the 
earl with the declarator he sought.86 Although the court acknowledged 
that litigants ordinarily allege a previous invasion of their rights, it 
explained that such allegations were not essential in declarator 
proceedings. The court thus “repelled” the objection to the pursuer’s 
declarator and found that he had a “right in terms of the act of 1592.”87 
Crucially, the court went on to provide essential clarification of the 
nature of the right, declaring that it “was not lawful for the Crown to 
work the said mines, or set them in feu or tack to any other person.”88 
The declarator both affirmed the earl’s right to mine the land and 
clarified that the earl’s right trumped any claim of the Crown.  
The Court of Session’s handling of Hopeton illustrates three 
distinctive features of Scots law. For starters, the declarator provided 
the earl with the certainty he sought, precisely the function of the 
modern declaratory-judgment proceeding. Scots law was famous for 
making declaratory-judgment actions available to litigants who were 
genuinely uncertain as to the nature of their legal rights.89 What’s more, 
the proceeding nicely illustrates the willingness of the Court of Session 
to entertain claims against the Crown. Session had long since 
established that pursuers in litigation with the Crown were to name the 
officers of state, perhaps the lord advocate or the minister of the Crown 
office involved in the litigation.90 No one regarded the interest of the 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 13,528. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. The Scots declarator proceeding thus provided the inspiration for English law reforms of 
the nineteenth century and eventually led to the adoption of declaratory-judgment proceedings 
in the United States. For more on English reform efforts to persuade Parliament to adapt the 
Scots declarator proceeding for use in English courts and a history tracing the origins of the Scots 
declarator to precursors in French law, see R.S., supra note 25, at 180. For more on the eventual 
adoption of reforms in England and the United States, see generally Borchard, supra note 52. 
 90. For a discussion of the origins of the Scots’ idea that individuals were free to interplead 
with the Crown, see SMITH, supra note 70, at 198. For an early statement of this principle, see 
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Crown as a barrier to the declaration of the earl’s right to mine his land 
and no claim of Crown immunity appears to have surfaced in the 
proceeding. Nor did Scots law require, as was the case in England, that 
the pursuer first seek leave to bring an action against the Crown. 
Finally, the decision highlights the Court of Session’s conception 
of its equitable role as the court of last resort in Scotland. The Court of 
Exchequer, to which the earl’s petition was initially referred, was a 
relatively new tribunal, at least in Scotland; it was created in 1707 in 
accordance with provisions of the Acts of Union that were designed to 
ensure the uniform collection of Crown revenue throughout the United 
Kingdom.91 Importantly, the Court of Session did not exercise any 
direct appellate oversight over the Scottish Court of Exchequer; 
instead, revenue matters were resolved in accordance with Exchequer 
tradition.92 Despite its inability to oversee Exchequer directly, 
however, the Court of Session was only too ready to provide the earl 
with the assurance he needed as to his right to conduct mining 
operations. It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that the court 
should stay its hand in deference to the Court of Exchequer or to the 
treasury department. 
3. Local Government Oversight.  Apart from its role in overseeing 
the legality of central government actions, the Court of Session often 
heard challenges to the way local governmental bodies managed the 
affairs of daily life. There was plenty of such work to do. Local 
government in eighteenth-century Scotland consisted of a patchwork 
quilt of overlapping entities, each with its own history and function.93 
 
BANKTON, supra note 70, at 602 (“All persons, even those in authority, may be pursued with us, 
without exception of the king; but then the officers of state are only called, they being bound to 
answer for his majesty.”). For more on the influence of English ideas of immunity, see Mitchell, 
supra note 25, at 304 (contending that Scots law later came to recognize Crown immunity likely 
as a consequence of English influence).  
 91. See 2 AE. J.G. MACKAY, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF SESSION 192–93 
(Edinburgh, T. &T. Clark 1879) (describing the Act of Union origins of the Court of Exchequer). 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer was transferred to the Court of Session in 1856. Id. 
For background on the Court of Exchequer’s introduction into Scotland as part of the Acts of 
Union and its role in collecting taxes, see WALKER, supra note 73, at 178–82. 
 92. Appeals from the Court of Exchequer were routed to the House of Lords. See A.J. 
MacLean, The 1707 Union: Scots Law and the House of Lords, 4 J. LEGAL HIST. 50 (1983). 
Although the Court of Exchequer was a new creation in Scotland and was to be conformable to 
the Court of Exchequer in England, the Acts of Union required that the existing law, private 
rights, and practice pursued in Scotland “be preserved.” Id. at 56. The Court of Session’s 
willingness to interpose by declarator may reflect a judgment that the Court of Exchequer had 
failed to protect the earl’s private rights. 
 93. WALKER, supra note 63, at 159. 
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By the eighteenth century, feudal baronies and regalities had lost much 
of their judicial function but maintained some administrative functions 
involving pasturage and infrastructure.94 Much local government was 
in the hands of local sheriffs, justices of the peace, and officers of the 
burghs. Royal burghs, originally market-centers with royally granted 
commercial monopolies,95 were “self-contained agencies of local 
government,” consisting of a local “constitution” or “sett” and 
governed by the burgh’s “provost[s], bailies and self-elective town 
councils.”96 Burghs of barony and other feudal offices also existed, 
although their government varied depending on the agreement with 
the feudal superior.97 The bailies of a burgh formed a burgh court with 
jurisdiction over both criminal and civil suits within the burgh, although 
more serious cases were eventually taken over by the justices of the 
peace and the Court of Session.98 In addition to its spiritual duties, the 
established church (kirk) managed public education and provided 
public support for the poor of the parish. Scottish ecclesiastical courts, 
like other inferior courts, were subject to the oversight of the Court of 
Session.99 
Often the boundary between what we would consider to be 
administrative and judicial functions was blurred. For example, justices 
of the peace had such disparate responsibilities as settling commercial 
disputes and small debt cases, maintaining roads and bridges, 
suppressing riots, and administering liquor licenses.100 Sheriffs, who 
served as representatives of the king (or the king’s vassals) in charge of 
“maintain[ing] order and the collection of revenue in the king’s 
name,”101 also had both judicial powers over civil and criminal suits and 
administrative functions.102 As one important forum for the oversight 
of these manifold functions (along with the Court of Exchequer), the 
 
 94. Id. Originally, feudal lords had both civil and criminal jurisdiction over the inhabitants 
of their lands. Id. at 115.  
 95. Id. at 119. 
 96. Id. at 159. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 120. 
 99. Kames explains that the Court of Session would not necessarily deprive a wrongly seated 
minister of his office but could review the decision to seat him and deprive him of his salary if the 
ecclesiastical court had proceeded wrongfully. See KAMES, supra note 25, at 240–41. 
 100. WALKER, supra note 63, at 159–60.  
 101. Id. at 117, 122. 
 102. Id. at 159. 
PFANDER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:12 AM 
1516  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1493 
Court of Session often found itself drawn into administrative matters, 
such as disputes over the accuracy of weights and measures.103 
B. Standing Law in Scotland 
1. Title and Interest To Sue.  In mounting a challenge to 
government (or private) activity, pursuers in the Court of Session were 
obliged to show that they had “title” and “interest” to sue, a feature of 
Scots law that was already well established by the eighteenth century. 
The Scottish constructs of title and interest to sue were in essence a 
standing requirement, a requirement that pursuers demonstrate a 
proper stake in the matter before the Court of Session would reach the 
merits of their claims. Indeed, Scots authorities linked the construct of 
title and interest to the Roman-law notion that litigants were required 
to show persona standi in judico.104 Thus, in the eighteenth century, the 
institutionalist George Mackenzie described title and interest to sue as 
a requirement that the pursuer have the “the Right standing in his 
Person” to bring the action, an echo of the Roman formulation.105  
As for the meaning of title and interest to sue, consider the 
characteristically pithy account in Kames’s Elucidations. Interest was 
relatively simple; it required that the actor—either plaintiff or 
defendant—receive some benefit from the action.106 In considering the 
 
 103. See Paterson v. Magistrates of Stirling (1783) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 
1997, 1999 (agreeing to resolve a dispute over the times at which a town market would commence 
the sale of yarn and further prohibiting its sale outside of the times fixed in the decree); Finlay v. 
Magistrates of Linlithgow (1782) ScotCS, in 17 MORISON, supra note 81, at 7390–92 (appointing 
experts to devise a uniform measuring device and decreeing that the town was prohibited from 
authorizing any measure that did not meet the new standard). See generally JOHN ERSKINE, AN 
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND bk. I, tit. 22, at 406 (Edinburgh, R. Fleming 1773) 
(describing the “ministerial” powers of the Court of Session as extending to the setting of prices 
in Edinburgh and the appointment of magistrates and other inferior officers, and ascribing these 
powers to the Court of Session’s status as successor to the Privy Council).  
 104. See 2 JOHN SHANK MORE, LECTURES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 260–62 (John 
McLaren ed., Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfute 1864) (treating the pursuer’s “proper title to sue” as 
the “first point to consider,” and observing that an “outlaw, having no persona standi in judico, 
can neither sue nor defend”). See generally DEANS, supra note 26, at 170–73. 
 105. MACKENZIE, 1706, supra note 31, at 274 (emphasis omitted). By the nineteenth century, 
treatise writers were distinguishing the two constructs. See 1 CHARLES FARQUHAR SHAND, THE 
PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF SESSION 169 n.1 (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1848) (“A title to pursue 
applies to particular actions, and requires, besides the general qualification of having a persona 
standi, that the party have both a title and an interest to urge the particular suit.”). Persona standi 
refers to the general capacity to sue; thus, infants and alien enemies were denied this capacity.  
 106. KAMES, supra note 1, at 213. 
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question of what sort of interest suffices to permit one to pursue or 
defend, Kames said the following: 
[I]n a court of justice, however well founded an action or a defence 
may be in itself, it will be rejected as idle and foolish, if the person 
who acts can draw no benefit from it, or have no interest in it, as 
expressed in law-terms. Hence a rule, That right without interest will 
not be sufficient in a process, either by way of action or objection: and 
as little will interest without right.107 
Both parties, according to Kames, had to show both title and interest 
in order to invoke the authority of a court of justice. The requisite 
interest was essentially financial108: as Kames explained, “no interest is 
regarded in a process but what is pecuniary,” and “[t]he interest of 
ambition, of revenge, or of any other passion that is not lucrative, is 
totally disregarded.”109 Here we perhaps find in Kames an early version 
of Justice Scalia’s suggested distinction between “Wallet Injury” and 
“Psychic Injury.”110 
Title was a more complicated, or at least more variegated, 
concept. As the term suggests, title was frequently used to describe a 
formal claim to legal ownership of the right in question (sometimes 
including the right to sue to vindicate the right). Kames defined title in 
this formal sense as “the evidence of a right,”111 a definition that calls 
to mind documentary evidence of title such as a deed to land or letters 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Kames explained that the requirement of title and interest was not limited to plaintiffs. 
Defendants too had to have title and interest, although “as every defendant finds in his account 
in an absolvitor, it is obviously his interest to defend himself against a claim that is not founded 
on law.” Id. at 217. The 1926 Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland states that a person called to 
defend had title because “the pursuer, by calling him as a defender, in effect concedes his title to 
defend, otherwise the pursuer’s own title would fail from want of interest.” 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, supra note 30, at 93. But in some cases, defendants did not have 
title. For example, a tenant on land conveyed as collateral for debt did not have title to challenge 
his eviction by the creditor through a challenge to the creditor’s right to the land, because the 
debtor rather than the tenant would have title to challenge the creditor’s right to the land. KAMES, 
supra note 1, at 220. 
 109. KAMES, supra note 1, at 214. 
 110. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (distinguishing “Wallet Injury” from “Psychic Injury” and concluding that the latter 
does not suffice to confer standing). 
 111. KAMES, supra note 1, at 127. Modern sources largely echo Kames. One modern source 
defines title as being “a party (using the word in its widest sense) to some legal relation which 
gives him some right which the person against whom he raises the action either infringes or 
denies.” DEANS, supra note 26, at 171 (quoting Lord Dunedin in Nicol v. Dundee Harbour Trs., 
(1915) SC (HL) 7). 
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patent conferring title to an office. But the Court of Session did not 
insist that pursuers present documentary evidence of their rights or 
titles; implication would suffice. Thus, Scots law recognized that one 
person’s duty or obligation implied another person’s right, conferring 
title to enforce the obligation.112 Still, only the owner of a right had title 
to sue regarding that right; other potentially interested parties were 
foreclosed from doing so.113 
To see how title and interest might perform slightly different 
functions as a test of a party’s ability to sue, consider an example from 
a Scots treatise. After discussing title and interest as a legal construct, 
one writer highlighted the importance of title by noting that, although 
a widow had an interest in her husband’s estate, title to pursue claims 
on behalf of the estate vested in the executor.114 Similarly, in contract 
actions, the seller had title to bring suit to recover the sales price from 
the buyer,115 but interested third parties to the legal relationship did not 
hold title to the right at issue. As the Scots explained matters, “a person 
has no title to sue in respect of a wrong done to another.”116 But, 
consistent with equitable notions, title was not inflexible. For example, 
if one were to make a contract to benefit a third party and then became 
unable to enforce that contract, the third party would be allowed to 
litigate the matter.117 
Practice in connection with title and interest bore some similarities 
to modern standing law in the United States in that it was regarded as 
a threshold requirement separate from the merits. To facilitate the 
court’s evaluation of the issue at the outset, practice required the initial 
statement of the case to include a description of the pursuer’s title and 
interest.118 Defenders were permitted to argue that the court should not 
reach the merits because the pursuer lacked title and interest to sue. 
 
 112. HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 6 (Edinburgh, Kincaid & Bell, 2d 
ed. 1767). 
 113. The Scots used the familiar term jus tertii to refer to the objection that an action was 
brought without the plaintiff having an interest. KAMES, supra note 1, at 214. 
 114. See 2 MORE, supra note 104, at 260–62. 
 115. KAMES, supra note 1, at 128. 
 116. 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, supra note 30, at 69. 
 117. KAMES, supra note 112, at 242. Landlord–tenant relations could complicate issues of title. 
Only the tenant had title to sue for “transitory” injuries to the property, such as trespass with no 
intent to create a permanent right. 7 GREEN’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 4–5 
(John Chrisholm ed., 2d ed. 1912). The landlord had no title to sue regarding injuries “merely to 
the possession (as, e.g., by noise, smoke, or vibration).” Id. But where the landlord’s rights or 
reversion were injured, the landlord had title to sue. Id.  
 118. ERSKINE, supra note 103, at 662.  
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Thus, in Anderson v. Magistrates of Renfrew,119 the defenders objected 
to the title of the pursuers, arguing that “private burgesses cannot 
compel their Magistrates to render account of their administration.”120 
Some leading eighteenth-century Scottish jurists described standing as 
a defense that had to be made before engaging on the merits of the 
action, or else it was waived.121 But on occasion, the court would reach 
the issue of title and interest to sue on its own motion.122 
Although other reasons may have contributed, the Court of 
Session chose to conduct a preliminary inquiry into standing in part to 
ensure the proper operation of preclusion, or res judicata. One treatise 
from the nineteenth century put it this way: “The interest of the 
defender to see that the pursuer has a proper title is obvious; for, 
otherwise, the discharge granted on payment of the claim may be 
insufficient, and a decree of absolvitor will not afford a plea of res 
judicata.”123 Kames explained that title and interest were required 
because a “decree is effectual between the litigants only; and a court 
will give no countenance to an action or to a defence that cannot be 
effectual.”124 Both writers were saying essentially the same thing. A 
decree will enjoy preclusive effect only if brought and defended by 
parties with title and interest to sue and defend. Therefore, the parties 
and the court must inquire into title and interest as a matter separate 
 
 119. Anderson v. Magistrates of Renfrew (1752) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 
2539; see also Guild v. Scott (1809) ScotCS, in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSION 469, 470 
(J.H. Mackenzie et al. eds., Edinburgh, Smellie 1811) (noting that the defendants “pleaded the 
preliminary objection, that the pursuers had no title to appear in the present action,” and arguing 
that the recognition of their title would be tantamount to the approval of a “popular action”).  
 120. Anderson, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 2539. 
 121. 2 ERSKINE, supra note 103, at 662. According to Erskine, a lack of persona standi in 
judicio was a “dilatory” defense relating to “preliminaries of a cause.” Id. As such, it was deemed 
waived if not pleaded before any “peremptory” defenses, “which enter into the merits of the cause 
itself.” Id. The 1926 edition of the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland agrees with Erskine. It 
refers to a plaintiff having to justify title and interest “if called upon by the defenders.” 1 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, supra note 30, at 66–67. Moreover, it agrees that, 
“[w]here a record was made up without any preliminary plea of no title, and a proof was allowed 
of consent to each party, . . . the defenders . . . waived the objection.” Id. at 68. But a defender 
could reserve the plea of no title. Id. 
 122. See Hamilton v. Minister of Cambuslang (1752) ScotCS, in 25 MORISON, supra note 81, 
at 10,570–71 (noting that, even though some of the judges of the Court of Session expressed doubt 
as to the title and interest of the pursuers, the court ultimately upheld the competence of the 
proceeding). On occasion, inquiries into title blended with the merits. See, e.g., Procurator-Fiscal 
of Haddington v. Forrest (1741) ScotCS, in 9 MORISON, supra note 81, at 7600–01 (concluding 
that the Justices of the Peace had no title to sue to block the building of pigeon houses, after 
finding that the proprietors had possessed the right to build for many years).  
 123. 1 SHAND, supra note 105, at 140. 
 124. KAMES, supra note 1, at 213.  
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from the merits of the claim and must refrain from adjudicating claims 
when preclusive effect will not apply and the court’s disposition will 
not be “effectual.”  
2. The Actio Popularis.  Despite its usual insistence on title and 
interest in private litigation, the Court of Session administered a well-
recognized exception for popular actions, thereby enabling suits to 
proceed on behalf of the public. Lord Bankton, author of a well-
regarded eighteenth-century treatise, put the matter this way: 
  A division of actions, not to be omitted, is into those, whereby the 
party interested only can sue; and those in which any person 
whatever, capable of suing, may prosecute the party, which last are 
called Popular Actions. Divers of these popular actions took place 
with the Romans; and some likewise obtain with us, as the 
prosecution of Invaders of ministers, and that against Usurers, where 
the parties interested do not sue, and that against Destroyers of the 
game, etc.125 
Erskine said much the same thing, tracing the popular action in 
Scotland to its roots in Roman law:  
  The Romans also divided actions into private and popular. Private 
actions could not be insisted in by such as had themselves no interest 
in the issue of the cause; but an actio popularis might have been 
carried on by any person. Certain actions ex delicto, which are 
authorised by our law, though they cannot be prosecuted by every 
one, yet carry a reward to the discoverer of the offence or crime, of a 
determinate portion of the penalty; as in usury, in offences against the 
game, and in those against statute.126 
Here then we find two of the eighteenth century’s best-known 
exponents of Scots law in agreement as to the Roman-law origins and 
viability of the popular action.127 
 
 125. BANKTON, supra note 70, at 610. 
 126. 2 ERSKINE, supra note 103, bk. IV, tit. I, at 933 (citations omitted).  
 127. See also PETER HALKERSTON, A TRANSLATION AND EXPLANATION OF THE PRINCIPAL 
TECHNICAL TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN MR. ERSKINE’S INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF 
SCOTLAND 202 (2d ed. 1829) (describing the actio popularis as an import from Roman law). The 
Scots encountered Roman influences through canon law and Roman law taught in universities. 
Scottish legal writers often considered Roman law to be “a guide and an inspiration but . . . not 
necessarily [something] to be followed at all or in detail.” William Gordon, Roman Law in 
Scotland, in 2 THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION IN SCOTLAND 27 (Robin Evans-Jones ed., 1995). 
“Although Roman law was still not regarded as having binding authority [in the Court of Session,] 
there are cases in which it appears in fact to have settled an issue.” Id. at 30. 
PFANDER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:12 AM 
2017] STANDING TO SUE 1521 
Eighteenth-century practice in the Court of Session confirmed the 
validity of popular actions to remedy grievances that moderns might 
characterize as generalized grievances. Consider Magistrates of 
Renfrew, an action brought by citizens (or burgesses) of the town of 
Renfrew to challenge the decision of the magistrates to lease public 
land.128 The magistrates argued that the pursuers lacked title to sue by 
“popular action,” both because the power to lease such lands was 
formally vested in them and because oversight of their management of 
the town’s affairs was vested in the Court of Exchequer. Citing an 
earlier case, Johnson v. Magistrates of Edinburgh,129 the pursuers 
replied that they sought to enforce a “public law” to vindicate a “right 
of pasturage” in the lands that was acquired by “immemorial 
possession.” The Court of Session upheld the burgesses’ title to pursue 
the action.130  
Much the same result obtained in The Merchant Co. v. Magistrates 
of Herriot’s Hospital.131 There, the merchants of Edinburgh were held 
to have proper title to sue to challenge the decision of the hospital’s 
board of governors to rent out hospital lands on unfavorable terms.132 
The hospital’s board of governors and the town magistracy were the 
obvious proprietors of the hospital’s rights and would normally enjoy 
title to sue. Indeed, in discussing the title of the citizens and trade 
companies in Edinburgh to bring an action for the sake of the hospital 
as third parties, the court acknowledged that the current governors of 
the hospital would be entitled to sue regarding actions of the previous 
governors. But the court recognized that the current governors were 
most unlikely to police themselves through a challenge to the lease.133 
 
 128. Anderson v. Magistrates of Renfrew (1752) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 
2539. 
 129. Johnson v. Magistrates of Edinburgh (1735) ScotCS, in 2 MORISON, supra note 81, at 96. 
 130. Anderson, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 2539 (citing Johnson, in 2 MORISON, supra 
note 81). The decision in Gilchrist v. Provost of Kinghorn appears to be broadly consistent with 
earlier decisions. Gilchrist v. Provost of Kinghorn (1771) ScotCS, in 17 MORISON, supra note 81, 
at 7366. There, the Court of Session found that a public action was not competent where burgesses 
sued for a general accounting of town finances; as the court explained, the task of performing a 
general accounting had been assigned to the Court of Exchequer. Id. at 7374. But “where 
individuals complained of a particular wrong, the action would be sustained, and redress given in 
[the Court of Session].” Id. at 7373. 
 131. The Merchant Co. v. Magistrates of Herriot’s Hospital (1765) ScotCS, in 8 MORISON, 
supra note 81, at 5752. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (“To say, that the present administrators have the sole right to call themselves to 
account, or declare their own powers, is absurd.”). The inhabitants of the hospital were all minors 
and could not sue on their own accord. Id. 
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The court therefore allowed the citizens (or burgesses) and merchants 
to bring a popular action because they were the “only persons who 
[could] insist in this action.”134 Essentially, then, the court recognized a 
popular action to facilitate a test of legality and to prevent a failure of 
justice. 
Something quite similar to a modern taxpayer action was allowed 
to proceed as a mechanism to contest the legality of new taxes and the 
management of public funds. Thus, in Tod v. Magistrates of St. 
Andrews,135 the Court of Session upheld an individual’s title to 
challenge a new tax on the transportation of city dung to farmers in the 
surrounding community.136 The court went a step further in Hamilton 
v. Minister of Cambuslang.137 The litigation arose after the parish 
ministry or kirk of Cambuslang conducted tent meetings and billed the 
expenses to the parish poor fund. Heritors (citizens) of the parish, 
obliged by law to support the poor, objected to the extravagant cost of 
the affair and questioned its propriety as a charge against the poor 
fund. The kirk session defended by invoking its discretion as to the 
disposal of charitable money.138 In the midst of the litigation, some 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Tod v. Magistrates of St. Andrews (1781) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 1997.  
 136. Id. (upholding the declarator and finding that the city lacked the power to impose a tax 
on the sale of dung). Review of the records of this case in the Scottish National Archives reveals 
that, in addition to David Tod, some nineteen tenant farmers joined in a letter complaining of the 
new dung tax. See Letter from David Tod to Thomas Ballray, Tod v. The Magistrates of the Town 
of St. Andrews, June 2, 1780, in NAT’L RECORDS OF SCOT., PAPERS OF THE SCOTTISH COURT OF 
SESSION, record no. CS235/T/4/3, Bldg. WRH, Floor 2, Room D, Bay 123 (visited Sept. 30, 2016) 
[hereinafter NAT’L RECORDS]. The records do not reveal the extent of any agreement to share 
the costs of litigation, but one can, without too much extrapolation, regard the proceeding as a 
form of class litigation in which Tod served as the representative for a sector of the neighboring 
agricultural community that was bearing the burden of a new tax imposed by St. Andrews. 
The foundation for the farmers’ critique of the tax, as elaborated in the papers of their 
counsel, Henry Erskine, was twofold: dung had been untaxed since time immemorial and the 
imposition of new taxes required a legislative act. See Information of Pursuer, June 1781, in NAT’L 
RECORDS, supra. The farmers did not, apparently, pay the tax themselves, but bore the incidence 
of the tax when they purchased dung from city-based purveyors. That explains the city’s 
contention, as recorded in the minutes, that the “action was incompetent, being brought at the 
instance of a single farmer in the neighborhood . . . who it is apprehended has no title whatever 
to insist therein.” Minutes in the Declarator, in NAT’L RECORDS, supra (recounting the argument 
of attorney Ferguson for the defenders).  
 137. Hamilton v. Minister of Cambuslang, (1752) ScotCS, in 25 MORISON, supra note 81, at 
10,570. 
 138. Id. at 10,571 (“All the articles [on the list of expenditures except one] were occasioned 
by the extraordinary confluence of people of this parish to attend divine ordinances; and as the 
benefit which arose from thence to the poor of the parish has been very great, it is highly 
reasonable that the expense [of public services] should burden those who had the only pecuniary 
benefit from them.”). 
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judges of the Court of Session expressed doubt that such a popular 
action was permissible.139 But the court upheld the right of a single 
heritor to sue the kirk session to obtain an “accounting for their 
management of the poor’s money.”140 On the merits, the court 
disallowed several items of expenditure, thereby compelling the kirk 
and its officers to restore the amounts to the poor fund.141 
Despite the court’s embrace of popular actions in some contexts, 
Scottish legal thinkers in the eighteenth century were not of one mind 
as to their wisdom and utility. Kames, in particular, had his doubts. In 
his report of Lang v. Magistrates of Selkirk,142 a case in which he 
appeared as counsel to the defenders, Kames recounts his argument 
that citizens lacked title and interest to pursue a claim to recover for 
the benefit of the town certain moneys that the town’s magistrates had 
allegedly embezzled or misspent.143 Kames first established that the 
“common-good of the burgh” is the property of the community, not of 
the individual citizens.144 The complaint (or libel) sought the return of 
money to the town’s coffers; it did not pursue a claim “for the benefit 
of the pursuers themselves.”145 It followed, according to Kames, that 
the pursuers had no title and no interest to pursue the matter.146 Title 
was in the burgh and, because the citizens were “destitute of a 
pecuniary interest” in the matter, they could not pursue it.147  
Having shown the absence of title and interest, it followed that the 
action could be sustained only “as a popular action, competent to every 
 
 139. Id. (“It occurred as a doubt to some of the Lords, whether this action was competent to 
one single heritor of the parish.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.; see also Tod v. Magistrates of St. Andrews (1781) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 
81, at 1997 (granting a declarator to the effect that the magistrates had no power to impose 
burdens or taxes on the inhabitants of the city, except as “particularly specified in their rights and 
charters”). 
 142. Lang v. Magistrates of Selkirk (1748) ScotCS, in HENRY HOME OF KAMES, 
REMARKABLE DECISIONS FROM 1730 TO 1752, at 181 (Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfute, 2d ed. 1799). 
 143. Id. at 184. The case was also reported in Morison’s dictionary, although perhaps 
inaccurately. See 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 2518. For more on Morison’s occasional lapses, 
see WALKER, supra note 73, at 14 (describing the work as plagued by “many defects” and as 
neither complete nor accurate). For an account different from that of Kames, see Lang v. 
Magistrates of Selkirk, in 4 M.P. BROWN, GENERAL SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT 
OF SESSION 2560 (Edinburgh, W. Tait 1829) (reporting that the court in Selkirk “pronounced 
opposite judgments; but before a final decision, the suit was compromised”). 
 144. Lang, in Kames, supra note 142, at 185. 
 145. Id. at 183. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. For more on the origins and current nature of common-good property in Scots law, 
see generally ANDREW C. FERGUSON, COMMON GOOD LAW (2006). 
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one of the lieges.”148 Kames sounded themes familiar to modern jurists 
by arguing against generalized rights to sue. If the popular action were 
to be accepted, he argued, then “any one person in Scotland, who 
please[d] to give himself the trouble, [would be] entitled to bring an 
action against the magistrates of any town for mal-administration.”149 
Although he acknowledged Roman practice in permitting some such 
actions, Kames explained that “experience [had] discovered” that 
“such processes were oftener directed by private resentment than by 
zeal for the public.”150 Accordingly, all of Europe was said to have “laid 
aside” the practice in civil and criminal cases, with the exception of 
“special cases . . . directed by particular statutes.”151 In effect, then, 
Kames argued that the Court of Session should refrain from 
recognizing popular actions except as approved by Parliament. 
Apart from this argument for deference to Parliament, Kames 
suggested that all popular actions would have to satisfy two “essential 
 
 148. Lang, in KAMES, supra note 142, at 184. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.; see id. (describing the pursuers as having abandoned the cause after recognizing the 
futility of their claim). As counsel to the defenders, Kames argued the following to the Court of 
Session: 
[N]o popular action whatever is admitted in our practice, unless it arise from express 
statute. In Roman law, more latitude was given. Private parties were allowed to bring 
actions for the benefit of the public, both civil and criminal. But as it has been found by 
experience that such process will oftener be [animated] by private resentment than by 
public good, they are laid aside through all Europe both in civil and criminal cases, 
special cases excepted, directed by particular statutes. No man is now indulged to bring 
a criminal accusation where his own interest is not concerned, except the King’s 
advocate who for that reason is styled the Calumniator Publicus. . . . Further, it must 
be observed upon this head that there is no instance ancient or modern of giving a 
popular action, unless where the interest of the public is concerned and where no single 
person has a private interest to form an action at his instance. It would be iniquitous 
and unnecessary to give an action in such a case for plainly the popular action cannot 
destroy the private action; and it would be hard beyond measure to oblige every person 
to [defend] a popular action where he is liable to be called to accompt a second time at 
the instance of the private party. [If such were permitted, the absolvitor in the popular 
action] will not operate [for the defender as] an exceptio rei judicate. 
Answer of Defenders, Lang v. The Magistrates of the Town of Selkirk, Nov. 1747, in NAT’L 
RECORDS, supra note 136. Here, Kames emphasizes that the legislature should take the lead in 
authorizing public actions, that public actions pose a problem for the defense of res judicata, and 
that private citizens generally cannot enforce the criminal law in the absence of a special interest. 
Id. On the latter point, rejecting private enforcement of criminal law, see Jardine v. De la Motte 
(1895) ScotCS, in 37 MORISON, supra note 81, at 16,138 (rejecting the right of a private citizen to 
institute a suit for perjury); Syme v. Steele (1765) ScotCS, in 37 MORISON, supra note 81, at 16,124 
(rejecting a private action to impose penal sanctions on a bankrupt individual without the 
approval of the King’s advocate). 
 151. Lang, in KAMES, supra note 142, at 184. 
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requisites.”152 First, the matter at hand must “concern the public.”153 
Second, the matter must be such “that no particular person ha[d] either 
an interest or title to pursue.”154 As to the first, Kames argued that the 
revenues of a burgh were not a public concern any “more than the 
administration of the revenues of a[] hospital or of a college.”155 As to 
the second, Kames explained that towns could always pursue 
magistrates after they left office, for any delicts committed during their 
terms as the officials in charge of the management of town revenues.156 
Kames also raised the specter of duplication and conflict, noting that 
the Court of Exchequer had the power to review town revenues and 
expenditures. If both a popular action and an Exchequer proceeding 
were pursued, the two tribunals could reach different decisions, leading 
to an inextricable “contrariety of judgment.”157 
Although powerful in the retelling, Kames’s argument did not 
immediately become the law of Scotland. To begin with, it does not 
appear that the Court of Session ruled against the pursuers in Selkirk.158 
Furthermore, in the Herriot’s Hospital case described above, a case 
that came down after Selkirk, the court rejected important elements of 
Kames’s argument in the Selkirk case. In Herriot’s Hospital, the 
pursuers were to gain no concrete pecuniary benefit for themselves; 
instead, the preservation of the land for the benefit of the hospital 
would redound to what Kames referred to as the common good.159 Yet 
the court nonetheless allowed the action against the hospital’s 
governors to proceed.160 By doing so, the court implicitly rejected both 
the argument that future magistrates might call the current magistrates 
to account and the claim that the recognition of a public action might 
interfere with Exchequer oversight.161 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 187–88. 
 158. Although Morison’s report of the case treats Kames’s argument as the rationale of the 
court in rejecting the pursuers’ claim, Kames’s own report simply suggests that the pursuers 
declined to press for a judgment because they “despair[ed] of success.” KAMES, supra note 142, 
at 188. Others report an inconclusive result and compromise. See supra note 143. 
 159. The Merchant Co. v. Magistrates of Herriot’s Hospital (1765), in 8 MORISON, supra note 
81, at 5752. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Gilchrist v. Provost of Kinghorn (1771) ScotCS, in 17 MORISON, supra note 81, at 
7373 (concluding that the Court of Exchequer’s authority to conduct a general accounting did not 
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If ineffective in the near term, the doubts expressed by Kames and 
others found their way into restatements of Scottish law in the 
nineteenth century.162 How then can we square the willingness of the 
Court of Session to hear public actions in the eighteenth century with 
the qualified denial of their viability in later years? One authority, 
James Maclaren, offered the following, suggested harmonization of 
Scottish authorities: 
Although it was stated in [early authorities that Scotland does not 
recognize the actio popularis,] this is hardly correct, as an actio 
popularis is now quite familiar where it partakes of the nature of a 
declarator or defence of a public right, and whether the encroachment 
is on the part of those entrusted with the duty of safe-guarding the 
interests of the public, or on the part of third parties. Accordingly, any 
member of the community has a title to sue a popularis actio to 
declare a public right-of-way; a right of market; a declarator that the 
navigation of a public navigable river should not be obstructed; a 
declarator of common use and enjoyment by the public of a piece of 
land; for the removal of a public danger or nuisance; and the like.163 
On this account, Scottish law settled on a practice that encouraged 
popular actions primarily in the nature of declaratory-judgment 
proceedings that would clarify contested public rights.  
Maclaren’s synthesis of Scots law suggests that the qualified 
nineteenth-century denials of the actio popularis were meant to 
 
displace the Court of Session’s role in reviewing specific claims of malfeasance brought by citizens 
against the town’s magistrates). It may not be amiss to note that Kames’s successors often treated 
his assertions about the content of the law with a grain of salt; Kames’s impressions of what the 
law ought to be were said to be “so lively on some occasions as to influence his judgment of what 
was truly done or meant on the Bench.” 1 BARON HUME, LECTURES: 1786–1822, at 15 (1939). 
 162. John Schank More reported in 1864 that Scotland had “departed from the rule of the 
Roman law” and held that “no popular action is with us competent to any informer in relation to 
crimes.” 2 MORE, supra note 104, at 431. Aeneas James George Mackay explained in 1893 that 
the “law of Scotland does not, as a general rule, recognise the popularis actio of the civil law by 
any one without a special title for the public interest.” AE. J. G. MACKAY, MANUAL OF PRACTICE 
IN THE COURT OF SESSION 138 (Edinburgh, William Green & Sons 1893). Writing in 1808, Robert 
Bell denied the existence of the action altogether, at least in civil matters. 2 BELL, supra note 68, 
at 608 (“In the Roman law there were certain actions which might have been carried on by any 
person, and this was termed an actio popularis; but with us there is no civil action of this 
description . . . .”). 
 163. JAMES ANDERSON MACLAREN, COURT OF SESSION PRACTICE 225–26 (1916); cf. Guild 
v. Scott (1809) ScotCS, in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSION supra note 119, at 469 
(upholding the public’s right to challenge the legality of the management of a toll road, despite 
the defender’s “preliminary objection” as trustee of the road that the pursuers had “no title to 
appear in the present action” and had “no more interest in the road than any other person who 
travelled it”).  
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capture the idea that Scotland had turned against one form of the 
proceeding. Erskine’s account of the actio popularis reveals that at 
least some proceedings featured a “reward” for the “discoverer” of the 
offense or crime.164 Such an account depicts a proceeding that closely 
resembles the informer action in England.165 Kames described such 
bounty-driven proceedings as problematic, motivated more by private 
resentment than by zeal for the public.166 Similar criticisms were leveled 
against bounty-driven informer actions in England.167 Scottish 
authorities agree that private enforcement of criminal law had largely 
ended by the nineteenth century, having been turned over to the King’s 
advocate.168 But the actio popularis proceedings Maclaren describes 
did not seek to recover a penal sum or award that would attract bounty-
hunting informer-litigants; as explained earlier, the relief took the form 
of a declaratory judgment and often involved a public body as a 
defender. The proceedings, moreover, arose from what we today 
describe as a problem of the “commons,” a situation in which rights are 
held in common by many individuals, no one of whom would suffer a 
distinctive or concrete injury. Rights to common pasturage, to common 
navigation, to public markets, and of course to dung169: these were the 
stuff of actio popularis litigation,170 and they bear some resemblance to 
the citizen suits of today.171 
 
 164. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
 165. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 166. See KAMES, supra note 142, at 184. 
 167. See Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 89–91 
(describing the abuses of the qui tam form of litigation and parliamentary efforts to address such 
concerns as collusive suits and technical complaints); Beck, supra note 41, at 573–85 (describing 
a series of problems with bounty-driven qui tam litigation and the various reforms adopted in 
England to address those problems). 
 168. See supra note 150. 
 169. For an explanation that the Scots’ actio popularis proceeding gave every member of the 
community title to sue for a public right, such as a right to common use and enjoyment of a piece 
of land, unobstructed navigation of a public river, and a right of market, see supra note 163 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the invalidation of a dung tax, see supra notes 135–36. 
 170. See, e.g., Guild v. Scott (1809) ScotCS, in DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSION, supra 
note 119, at 469 (common right to travel a well-maintained toll road); Gilchrist v. Provost of 
Kinghorn (1771) ScotCS, in 17 MORISON, supra note 81, at 7366, 7371 (allowing a popular action 
to contest specific town expenditures of public money); Anderson v. Magistrates of Renfrew 
(1752) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 81, at 2539 (common rights of pasturage); Hamilton v. 
Minister of Cambuslang (1752) ScotCS, in 25 MORISON, supra note 81, at 10,570 (heritors’ right 
to use of poor fund); Provost & Magistrates of Glasgow v. John Barns (1685) ScotCS, in 5 
MORISON, supra note 81, at 2515 (explaining that citizens may challenge the town council’s 
decision to forgive the debt of a former magistrate). 
 171. See infra notes 297–305 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Problem of Preclusion.  Among the more remarkable 
features of Scots public law was its recognition that the public action 
could present a problem of preclusion. Public actions were thought to 
contemplate, in the words of Kames, that “any one person in 
Scotland”172 might sue to enforce a public right; they necessarily 
presented the prospect that a single defender might be compelled to 
appear again and again.173 The Court of Session dealt with the problem 
of possible duplication in practical terms. Actio popularis litigation was 
given some preclusive effect, but only as to suits brought by persons 
with the same interest in the matter as the original pursuer and only 
where it was equitable to do so.174 Thus, the Scots law of preclusion 
barred some public litigation that was truly duplicative—for example, 
when the same claim was brought for the same reason—while still 
allowing those with different interests to vindicate their own rights. 
Before explaining the operation of the preclusion rules as they 
applied to the actio popularis, this section sketches the Scottish law of 
preclusion, which differs somewhat from that with which American 
readers are familiar. Initially recognized as an equitable doctrine, 
preclusion had evolved by Kames’s day to allow a pursuer to offer 
“proof” that an issue in an earlier suit between the same parties had 
been resolved against the defender. Kames explained that this rule of 
preclusion was recognized “for the ease of the witnesses and for saving 
expence.”175 The defender could raise whatever objections he had to 
 
 172. KAMES, supra note 142, at 184. 
 173. English authorities bore the same concern. Thus, Sir Edward Coke worried about a 
“multiplicity of suits” in public actions and Sir William Blackstone explained that public actions 
were properly vested in a single public prosecutor to prevent the defendant’s harassment by 
“every subject in the kingdom.” Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 702 (first quoting 1 
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56a (London, 
W. Clarke & Sons 1853); and then quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219). In 
light of these worries, English law sought to impose limits on the relators who could bring public 
actions. At common law, the statutory recovery went to the first plaintiff to file suit; later actions 
were subject to dismissal. See Winter, supra note 10, at 1407 n.191. Recognizing that such dismissal 
created an incentive for collusive initial litigation, common law courts held that collusion would 
deprive the first litigation of preclusive effect. See id.  
 174. In other contexts, a comparable form of nonmutual preclusion could be used offensively 
by different pursuers against a single defendant, thus preventing further litigation on an issue that 
had already been decided. See infra note 177.  
 175. KAMES, supra note 1, at 174. Although at common law “no proof is sustained but what 
is taken in preference of the judge,” equity allowed this practice. Id. In contrast to a process 
resolved against the defendant, in the case of a “decreet absolvitor” in which the defendant wins, 
a court would allow a new action when new evidence became available or new law was relevant. 
Id. at 178–80. This was because “res judicata ha[d] no authority except with respect to the points 
determined; for so far only did the judge interpose his authority.” Id. at 180. More modern sources 
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the witness’s testimony in the new lawsuit.176 Thus, the Scots law of 
preclusion, at least in the eighteenth century, functioned in somewhat 
the same way as collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.177 
The same-parties (or mutuality) requirement was not absolute. 
Kames observed that it was “frequently practiced” that proof was 
admitted offensively in cases with the same defendant but different 
plaintiffs,178 although Kames cautioned against allowing serial suits 
against the same defender in cases where it would be inequitable.179 
Similarly, Kames warned against allowing such offensive proof with a 
different defender because such a defender has “had no opportunity to 
put cross interrogatories to the witnesses.”180 But even this restriction 
was not always obeyed. For example, Kames “observe[d] with regret” 
cases in which a superior landowner’s right was invalidated, and then 
that judgment was given preclusive affect against lesser land claimants 
who had not been party to the original action.181 Representatives of a 
pursuer were also considered fair game for preclusion.182 A later source 
 
state the standard requirements of res judicata familiar to U.S. legal scholars and practitioners: 
“(a) a proper previous determination of the subject in question; (b) the parties to the second cause 
must be identical with, or representative of, the parties to the first cause, or have the same 
interests; (c) the subject-matter of the two actions must be the same; and (d) there must be identity 
of media concludendi or grounds of action in law or in fact.” 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF SCOTLAND, supra note 33, at 550; see 10 GREEN’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 117, at 287.  
 176. KAMES, supra note 1, at 174. 
 177. The law of the United States distinguishes between claim and issue preclusion. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). The former bars claims 
that bear a transactional relationship to claims between the same parties that were previously 
resolved by a judgment on the merits; the latter treats an issue that was actually litigated and 
necessarily decided in earlier litigation as binding on the same parties in subsequent litigation. See 
generally ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (2001) (reviewing claim and issue preclusion); DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2001) (same). Although a rule of 
mutuality once limited the operation of these doctrines to the parties and their privies, courts 
have come to recognize some forms of nonmutual issue preclusion. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery 
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (allowing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel 
against a private party); cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984) (rejecting the use 
of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government). 
 178. See KAMES, supra note 1, at 176, 182. For example, it was common practice, although not 
improper at law, to allow evidence of improper interference with a decedent’s estate to migrate 
between suits against the same defendant but different plaintiffs. Id. at 175–76. 
 179. Id. at 183. For example, on equitable principles, preclusion should apply if multiple heirs 
serially sued on a claim arising out of an estate. Id. 
 180. Id. at 176. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 182. 
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notes that it had to be the case “that the parties to the second action 
represent the same interests as those in the first.”183 
Title interacted with preclusion in complex ways. When “the new 
process [was] the same with the former [litigant], except as to the 
pursuer’s title,” there was not deemed to have been preclusion “in 
strict law.”184 But, in equity, Kames thought preclusion should have 
applied due to the “principle of expediency” because, absent more 
evidence, a pursuer had “no reason to expect an alteration” and should 
not “distress” the defendant without some “rational prospect of 
success.”185 Thus, as a formal matter, the same person could seemingly 
bring the same suit based upon the same evidence without any risk of 
preclusion, so long as the second action was based on different title. 
But in practice, things were more textured. Kames explained that 
courts of equity were to apply rules of preclusion to bar the second 
proceeding unless there was some “rational prospect of success.” 
Adapting the private law of preclusion to public actions posed a 
challenge for the Court of Session. In Comb v. Magistrates of 
Edinburgh,186 an action brought by brewers challenging a tax levied on 
beer, the magistrate-defenders argued that, because overseers 
appointed by Parliament could bring a suit regarding the taxes even 
after the brewers had sued, the brewers should not be able to bring 
their suit.187 They argued that it was a maxim of Scottish law that “no 
person is bound to answer as a defender in any case, or with any 
pursuer where an absolvitor will not afford him an exceptio res judicata 
against a similar process, raised at the instance of any other person.”188 
The Court of Session overruled this objection, saying that the objection 
did not apply regarding damages and a declarator to prevent repetition 
of the damages. In Herriot’s Hospital, the court recognized a similarly 
limited view of the preclusive effect of a proposed declaratory action 
on behalf of the public interest, saying “[t]hat inconveniency attends 
all popular actions, which however are known in the law of 
 
 183. 10 GREEN’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 117, at 291; see also id. at 312 (“The principle 
has further been recognised, that it is enough if the parties represent the same interest. In teind 
causes, a judgment against the common agent in a locality is res judicata against all the heritors.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 184. KAMES, supra note 1, at 181. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Matthew Comb v. Magistrates of Edinburgh (1794) ScotCS, in 5 MORISON, supra note 
81, at 2540. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
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Scotland.”189 Thus, the general requirement of preclusive effect, 
otherwise essential to make a matter justiciable, was (like title and 
interest to sue) sometimes set aside as a threshold matter to enable 
popular actions to proceed. 
But in some circumstances, actio popularis decrees were given 
limited preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. The preclusive effect 
of an actio popularis was contingent on “sufficient identity of interest” 
between earlier and later litigants190: 
The answer to the question as to whether there is such community of 
interest as to make a previous decision res judicata as against the 
parties to a subsequent action, would appear to depend largely upon 
whether there is or is not a contract expressed or implied between the 
parties to the proceedings or their authors or ancestors.191  
In an action for the public right-of-way, “where certain parties appear 
or are called as representing the interests of the general public,” the 
general public is bound by the decision in the earlier suit. But an action 
by the magistrates of Edinburgh regarding use of a public market was 
not thought to preclude a second proceeding by members of the 
general public, apparently in recognition that there was no identity of 
interests.192 Thus, the Court of Session found a middle ground between 
precluding all duplicative litigation and allowing actio popularis ad 
infinitum. 
C. Roman Influence on Scots Law 
Although this brief survey does not capture the story in full, it 
offers an intriguing basis on which to assess the practices of the Court 
of Session in light of Roman law. By the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Scots had taken a more “relaxed” view of Roman precedents; that is, 
while Roman law furnished the foundation of Scottish law, the Scots 
had grown more confident in their own ability to evaluate and refine 
legal principles to take account of changes in their increasingly 
 
 189. Merchant Co. & Trades of Edinburgh v. Magistrates of Herriot’s Hosp. (1765) ScotCS, 
in 8 MORISON, supra note 81, at 5752. 
 190. 10 GREEN’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 117, at 292 (citing nineteenth-century cases).  
 191. Id.; see also LORD CLYDE & DENIS J. EDWARDS, JUDICIAL REVIEW 386 (2000) (“The 
decision in an actio popularis decided against one member of the public will be res judicata against 
all other members of the public.”).  
 192. 10 GREEN’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 117, at 292.  
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commercial economy and society.193 Eighteenth-century treatment of 
the actio popularis by the Court of Session shows some signs of this 
form of respectful adaptation.  
Consider for comparative purposes the description of the Roman 
public action that appears in Justinian’s Digest. The Digest, as 
translated by Alan Watson, includes the following entry under the 
heading, “Popular Actions”: 
Paul, Edict, book 8: We describe as a popular action one which looks 
to the public interest. 
Paul, Edict, book 1: If more than one wish to bring the action, the 
praetor will choose the most suitable plaintiff. 
Ulpian, Edict, book 1: But, if proceedings be brought more than once 
on the same ground, the common defense of res judicata will lie. In 
the case of popular actions, preference is given to the person who has 
an interest in bringing the proceedings. 
Paul, Edict, book 3: A popular action is granted to a competent 
person, that is, one whom the edict allows to bring proceedings.194 
Four intriguing features emerge from the Digest’s account of the actio 
popularis: that individuals who were otherwise competent to litigate 
could bring public actions, that some system must be devised to select 
the most “suitable plaintiff,” that some sort of “interest” might provide 
the basis on which to make such a selection, and that some form of 
preclusion must be recognized to protect defendants from the burden 
of repeated litigation.195 
All four elements made their way into Scots practice, at least to 
some degree. Kames and others recognized that, in its purest form, the 
popular action was available to any “liege[]” in the country.196 Kames 
sought to limit those who could pursue popular actions for fear that 
 
 193. See Ewald, supra note 22, at 1101–02 (observing this more “relaxed” attitude in the mid-
century work of John Millar, who viewed Roman law less as a set of prescriptive rules than as a 
source of historical analogues from which to reason, and in the work of Kames, who in his 
Historical Law Tracts treatise began to reflect about the expediency of the law). 
 194. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, bk. 47, § 23, 793 (Alan Watson ed., 1985). 
 195. The Roman-law preference for the most suitable plaintiff may explain Kames’s view that 
popular actions were unavailing in any case in which any “single person” had an adequate private 
interest to support a suit. See supra note 150. One finds modern echoes in some aspects of modern 
standing law, which has been described in relative terms. See Re, supra note 4, at 1196 (arguing 
that standing law enables courts to conduct a relativistic inquiry aimed at identifying plaintiffs 
with the greatest stake in securing the requested remedy).  
 196. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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defenders would face the prospect of endless litigation. Although the 
Court of Session did not embrace Kames’s restrictive view, it appears 
to have exercised some discretion in the matter. Thus, the court 
allowed the popular action in circumstances where one or more 
champions stepped forward on behalf of a group with a community of 
interest. The court also adapted its doctrine of preclusion to offer some 
assurance to defenders that those with a specific interest could mount 
but a single challenge to the actions in question. Finally, in emphasizing 
the need for actio popularis litigation to address the problems of the 
commons, the Court of Session would eventually turn away from 
bounty-driven litigation of the kind that persuaded many reformers to 
cut back on the scope of the qui tam action in England.197 
II.  THE LESSONS OF SCOTS STANDING LAW 
What lessons can one draw from this review of practice in the 
eighteenth-century Scottish Court of Session? No one would argue that 
the Scots invented standing law or that Scottish ideas were 
incorporated jot and title into Article III’s definition of the judicial 
power.198 To the contrary, the practice of the Court of Session and the 
actio popularis have, so far at least, played little role in the debates over 
the nature of the federal judicial power.199 The tendency to ignore 
Scottish practice may reflect a variety of factors: the Supreme Court’s 
own Anglo-centric tendency to invoke the courts at Westminster in 
defining the historical meaning of Article III, the relative dominance 
of Blackstone as a convenient source for those seeking an introduction 
to the English common law that shaped the Framers’ legal world, a 
general tendency to ignore civil law and Scottish institutions, and the 
dearth of reliable case reports from the Scottish court system.200 As 
Blackstone and English common law crowded out Scots law as a source 
in nineteenth-century litigation, Scottish practices slipped from view.201 
 
 197. See supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text.  
 198. See generally ARTHUR L. HERMAN, HOW THE SCOTS INVENTED THE MODERN WORLD 
(2001) (cataloging the influence of Scots and the Scottish enlightenment, but making no claim 
about Scottish influence on American conceptions of judicial power).  
 199. The Israeli High Court of Justice, by contrast, has occasionally referred to the actio 
popularis in its discussions of standing doctrine. See HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Ministry of Defence 
42(2) PD 441, 442 (1988) (Isr.). 
 200. For criticisms of the quality of Morison’s reports, see supra note 143. 
 201. For the development of these ideas, see Pfander & Birk, Scottish Judiciary, supra note 
20, at 1625, 1685. That work discusses the possibility that Scots legal institutions may have had a 
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Despite the lack of direct transplantation, the Scots’ experience 
may have important lessons to teach about the way a court might use 
the law of standing as a judicially managed restriction on otherwise far-
reaching equitable authority. As a matter of history, courts of equity 
exercising civil law authority may have been forced to confront the 
need to establish limits on the scope of their judicial power.202 Courts 
of law, particularly those working within the parameters of the writ 
system in England, were more closely tied to the rights of action 
embedded in the writs.203 While common law courts could expand their 
jurisdiction through fictions and recognize new claims for which 
particular writs would lie, they rarely faced the unbridled claim to do 
justice in the absence of any other remedy.204 This last-resort remedial 
function fell to the courts of equity and—particularly in Scotland—to 
the Court of Session, which faced in its sharpest form the challenge of 
defining limits to judicial power in a world with other institutional 
actors.205 
 
greater impact on the way the framers structured the federal judiciary under Article III than on 
the content of nineteenth-century American common law.  
 202. In the English High Court of Chancery, by contrast, open-ended petitions to do right by 
the parties had given way to the more structured forms of common law pleading and remedies 
that characterized the eighteenth century.  
 203. See Carol Harlow, Gillick: A Comedy of Errors?, 49 MOD. L. REV. 768, 769 (1986) 
(noting that in England, concepts of locus standi were included in the common law and varied 
according to the remedy sought). 
 204. For more on the use of fictions, see BAKER, supra note 39, at 47–49 (describing fictions 
used by English courts to expand their jurisdiction). For a discussion of the challenges posed by a 
broad right to petition for judicial review, see generally Harlow, supra note 203. Harlow explores 
the problems created by England’s all-purpose action for a declaration of rights, which enables 
petitioners to contest matters of public administration when they lack the private interest 
necessary to confer standing. Id.  
 205. It may be that the English courts of equity, similarly charged with providing remedies 
when the common law ran out, felt similar pressure to articulate limits on the right to sue. But 
doctrinal limits on the scope of equitable power may have alleviated that pressure. One leading 
treatise, for example, regarded the principles by which courts of equity acted as “very well 
settled.” 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 20, at 20 (W.H. Lyon, 
Jr. ed., 14th ed. 1918) (quoting Lord Redesdale). Those settled principles held that antisuit 
injunctions fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of courts of equity and courts of law, which 
shared authority over matters of property and contract, and would issue to vindicate three 
defenses: fraud, mistake, and accident. 2 STORY, supra, § 1198, at 562; see also 1 JOHN NORTON 
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 136–40, at 186–94 (Spencer W. Symons 
ed., 5th ed. 1941) (affirming that equity sorted proceedings into three categories: concurrent (with 
jurisdiction shared between courts of law and equity); exclusive (such as matters of trust 
administration that only courts of equity handled); and auxiliary (including bills of discovery and 
bills of peace)); id. § 188, at 269–70 (including accident, mistake, and fraud as the bases for equity’s 
concurrent jurisdiction over antisuit injunctions). England did not adopt the all-purpose 
declaratory-judgment action until the middle of the nineteenth century, and it did not take root 
PFANDER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:12 AM 
2017] STANDING TO SUE 1535 
Three lessons emerge from the Court of Session’s struggle to 
define a Scottish law of standing. First, the Scots’ doctrine of title and 
interest to sue provides additional evidence that private litigation 
necessitates an inquiry into standing. Indeed, title and interest bear 
more than a passing resemblance to the concepts of injuria and 
damnum, which played a role in Founding-era debates about the right 
to sue in the courts of the United States.206 Second, the Scots’ 
acceptance of the actio popularis proceeding suggests that public 
actions were seen as a very different matter from private litigation; to 
ensure that public authorities complied with the law, the Court of 
Session was forced to consider how far to go in relaxing the strict rules 
of standing that governed private matters. Third, the Scots’ concern 
with giving preclusive effect in public law actions, echoes of which one 
finds in the writings of Coke and Blackstone,207 provides one reason 
why courts might choose to separate their standing law from an inquiry 
into the merits. It thus may invite a closer look at the proposal, widely 
shared among scholars, to collapse the two inquiries.208 After taking a 
comparative look at these developments, this Part interrogates modern 
currents in standing law and scholarship. 
A. Scots Standing Law: A Comparative Look 
Scots law provides a novel point of comparison for scholars 
exploring the development of standing law in the United States. Part 
II.A examines the Scottish constructs of title and interest to sue, the 
actio popularis, and the doctrine of preclusion. It also finds a series of 
surprising connections to work that has been done on the historical 
evolution of standing law in the United States. 
1. Title and Interest To Sue.  The Scottish constructs of title and 
interest to sue bear more than a passing resemblance to the Latin terms 
injuria, the invasion of a legal right, and damnum, a real-world harm. 
 
there until the 1880s. See Developments in the Law: Declaratory Judgments—1941–1949, 62 
HARV. L. REV. 787, 790 (1949) (tracing the English declaratory judgment to the Chancery 
Procedure Act of 1852 and to the exercise of rule-making authority in 1883).  
 206. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.  
 207. See supra note 173.  
 208. Among the prominent scholars who have endorsed such an integration of standing and 
the merits, see Fletcher, supra note 42, at 239, who suggests that standing be regarded as a merits 
question to be resolved under applicable substantive law, and David P. Currie, Misunderstanding 
Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41–47. Many scholars have interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Lexmark as a partial endorsement of the suggested joinder of standing and the 
merits. 
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The Scots required that both title and interest be present to support 
private litigation; Kames proclaimed that “right without interest 
[would] not be sustained in a process, . . . as little will interest without 
right.”209 The Kames formulation tracks the English idea that certain 
genuine harms (damna) might not arise from a litigable invasion of the 
plaintiff’s legal rights (injuria). English jurists thus spoke of damnum 
absque injuria to capture the idea that a party might suffer a genuine 
loss without having suffered the legally actionable injury that would 
support litigation.210 In Scottish terms, the pursuer might have a 
pecuniary interest without having title to sue. 
Similar ideas were reflected in early American restatements of the 
law governing the right to maintain an action.211 Justice Story viewed 
the right to sue as necessarily entailing both elements: “[T]o maintain 
an action, both [wrong and damage] must concur; for damnum absque 
injuria, and injuria absque damno, are equally objections to any 
recovery.”212 John Bouvier’s American law dictionary drew the same 
connection.213 Woolhandler and Nelson have invoked these authorities 
in arguing that some personal interest or stake was required.214  
Other scholars observe that, at least in some circumstances, it 
would suffice for the plaintiff to show an invasion of a legal right 
(injuria) without any accompanying damage or harm. Thus, Professor 
Andrew Hessick argues that, at least in trespassory tort claims, the 
legal invasion itself implied a harm that would suffice to make the 
 
 209. KAMES, supra note 1, at 213. 
 210. See, e.g., Ashby v. White (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 808, 810–11 (Gould, P.J.) (“[A]n injuria 
sine damna . . . will not bear an action, for both must necessarily concur to maintain the action; 
for things must not only be done amiss, but it must redound to the prejudice of him that will bring 
his action for it.”), rev’d, 91 Eng. Rep. 665; Cable v. Rogers (1625) 81 Eng. Rep. 259, 259 
(Dodderidge, J.) (“[I]njuria and damnum are the two grounds for the having all actions . . . : if 
there be damnum absque injuria, or injuria absque damno, no action lieth . . . .”). Ashby was 
overturned by the House of Lords, apparently vindicating Lord Holt’s dissent. See Woolhandler 
& Nelson, supra note 13, at 719 n.146. 
 211. See 6 DANE, supra note 40, at 589 (observing that unless the plaintiff shows by his bill 
“sufficient title or equity,” the defendant’s demurrer should be sustained). Dane appears to be 
referring to the plaintiff’s title to property at the center of the dispute, rather than identifying a 
general threshold requirement comparable to that in Scotland.  
 212. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 236 (Boston, Little & 
Brown 1839). Woolhandler and Nelson suggest that Justice Story may not have been entirely 
consistent on the point. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 719 n.146. 
 213. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
636 (4th ed. 1852) (“Injury without damage or loss will not bear an action.”).  
 214. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 719 n.146. 
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invasion actionable.215 In support, Hessick cites Lord Holt’s later-
vindicated dissent in Ashby v. White216: “[S]urely every injury imports 
a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing, and it is 
impossible to prove the contrary; for a damage is not merely pecuniary, 
but an injury imports a damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his 
right.”217 Hessick also points to defamation claims, where the 
reputational injury was presumed, and nominal-damages claims, where 
the invasion itself gave rise to an action.218 Other scholars have reached 
similar conclusions about the traditional willingness of courts to hear 
claims without invariably demanding a showing of formal injury.219  
Although the modern Supreme Court has wrestled with how best 
to apply its injury rule in the context of federal statutory rights to sue,220 
we find little evidence that nineteenth-century American law formally 
incorporated the Scottish ideas of title and interest as a threshold limit 
on a pursuer’s right to sue. Some nineteenth-century decisions 
nonetheless informally emphasized the importance of concepts like 
title and interest as a limit on the judicial power and did so, perhaps 
not surprisingly, in the context of suits brought in equity. In 
Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co.,221 for example, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the dismissal of the city’s bill to enjoin as a public 
nuisance the construction of an aqueduct on the Potomac River.222 The 
 
 215. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
275, 280–84 (2008). 
 216. Ashby v. White (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 808, rev’d, 91 Eng. Rep. 665. 
 217. Hessick, supra note 215, at 282 (quoting Ashby, 87 Eng. Rep. at 816 (Holt, C.J., 
dissenting)).  
 218. Id. at 307.  
 219. Fletcher, supra note 42, at 249; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 171; Winter, supra note 10, at 
1397. 
 220. The Court clarified matters a bit in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, holding that plaintiffs seeking 
to enforce a congressionally conferred right of action must allege an injury that is both concrete 
and particularized. Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). Although the Court 
vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision that injury would presumptively flow from any 
particularized statutory violation, the Court’s analysis left ample room for the plaintiff to bring 
his claims within the standard announced for allegations of injury. See id. at 1549–50. A bare 
procedural violation in the company’s collection and dissemination of credit information would 
not do, but the Court nonetheless confirmed the viability of claims of a procedural violation where 
the plaintiff suffers intangible injuries of the kind with which Congress was concerned. Id. In 
evaluating intangible injuries for concreteness, the Court explained that it was “instructive” to 
consider the kinds of harms that have traditionally been regarded as legally cognizable in assessing 
the viability of claims of de facto injury that Congress has “elevate[d]” to the status of cases and 
controversies. Id. at 1549.  
 221. Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91 (1838). 
 222. Id. at 92–93. 
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Court observed that public nuisances were subject to challenge in a 
variety of proceedings: by criminal indictment, by private suit for 
damages brought by one who has suffered special damage, and by 
information filed by the attorney general.223 In light of these modes of 
redress, equity would take cognizance of a bill to enjoin a nuisance only 
when brought by a private person who faces “an imminent danger of 
suffering a special injury.”224 No averment of special injury appeared in 
Georgetown’s bill. In any case, the Court found that the city could not 
represent the interests of any private parties who might sue to enjoin 
the nuisance; the city and its officials did not have the sort of “interest 
as enables them to sue in their own name.”225  
A similar inquiry took place a century later in connection with an 
evaluation of the right of a railroad company to pursue injunctive relief 
against a merger of competing roads that would curtail its ability to 
compete for business in the Chicago area. According to the Court, the 
defendants “contend[ed] that the plaintiffs ha[d] not the legal interest 
necessary to entitle them to challenge the order.”226 But the Court 
rejected this contention, observing that the merger had already 
inflicted losses worth $10 million.227 Having found sufficient interest, 
the Court evaluated the plaintiffs’ claim of right or title.228 It found that 
the federal law governing transportation “entitled” the plaintiffs to 
“equality of treatment.”229 As proper parties to the proceeding before 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the plaintiffs were viewed as 
entitled to seek review in equity of the agency’s order permitting the 
merger to proceed.230 
Scholars contest the significance of the nineteenth-century cases 
along several dimensions. Woolhandler and Nelson treat the early 
nineteenth-century nuisance cases as articulating a body of law that 
governs “standing” to seek civil remedies for the violation of public 
rights, arguing that equitable doctrines served as precursors to 
constitutional developments.231 But Professor Steven Winter argues 
that the rules governing suit for public nuisance, such as those involved 
 
 223. Id. at 97–98. 
 224. Id. at 98. 
 225. Id. at 100. 
 226. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 266 (1924). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 267.  
 230. Id. at 266–67. 
 231. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 701.  
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in Georgetown, were simply understood as part of the substantive law 
of equitable remediation, rather than a constitutionally based standing 
doctrine that expressed a “purely procedural concept.”232 This 
characterization appears to conform in part to the view of at least some 
Scots who regarded title and interest to sue as a matter that could vary 
depending on the nature of the claim.233  
Recent scholarship contends that the law of standing as 
administered by the Supreme Court may well depend on the context in 
which the claim arises. Professor Evan Lee and Josephine Ellis argue 
that the Court requires less by way of injury-in-fact in cases in which 
litigants sue to enforce procedural rights conferred by Congress than it 
does in other forms of litigation.234 More generally, Professor Richard 
Fallon identifies an “accelerating trend toward doctrinal 
fragmentation,” in which specialized rules of standing apply to specific 
forms of litigation.235 Fallon shows that this fragmentation stands in 
tension with the Court’s own aspiration to “conceptual unity,” in which 
a uniform body of standing law would apply with equal force to claims 
of all sorts.236 Perhaps the fragmentation that Lee, Ellis, and Fallon 
identify represents a return to the roots of a standing inquiry that 
depends on the particulars of the legal claim being asserted.  
Apart from the factors that help explain the fragmentation of 
standing, the Court may be using Article III to reclaim a judicial role 
in tailoring rights to sue in a world increasingly populated by statutes. 
The Court has taken a well-known turn against the recognition of 
judge-made rights of action, preferring that Congress take the lead in 
 
 232. Winter, supra note 10, at 1419, 1422 (characterizing the standing inquiry in early cases as 
one “into the merits” and noting that it was not until much later that standing was understood as 
a “purely procedural concept”). 
 233. See DAVID MAXWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF SESSION 149 (1980) (“Title to 
sue in any particular case, being a matter of the substantive law, should be sought in specialist 
works on the subject . . . .”); 1 SHAND, supra note 105, at 169 n.1 (“A title to pursue applies to 
particular actions, and requires, besides the general qualification of having a persona standi, that 
the party have both a title and an interest to urge the particular suit.”). 
 234. See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 174 (2012). 
 235. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2015). 
Focusing on what the Court does, Fallon identifies ways in which the bite of the injury 
requirement varies from claim to claim. See, e.g., id. at 1071–75, 1077–79 (identifying differing 
applications of the injury requirement to claims in the Establishment Clause and national security 
contexts, among others). 
 236. Id. at 1067.  
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authorizing private suits in federal court.237 Such congressional primacy 
complicates the task of maintaining judicial control over the viability 
of particular claims, a task that common law courts had traditionally 
performed in connection with determining whether particular forms of 
action could be adapted to new circumstances.238 Although the Court 
can tailor suability to some degree through statutory interpretation,239 
the broad citizen-suit provisions of some statutes like those governing 
environmental protections leave less room for the role of 
interpretation. The Court’s use of Article III to justify its refusal to give 
effect to such a provision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife240 thus 
represents a reassertion of judicial control.241 
A similar bid for judicial control may underlie the Court’s decision 
in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.242 Treating the right to 
seek the judicial invalidation of preempted state law as a matter 
governed by the flexible provisions of federal equity, the Exceptional 
Child Court neatly broadened its own authority to determine the 
viability of similar litigation in future cases.243 It thus avoided the 
rigidity that might have resulted had it affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion that the right of action in question was an unbending 
implication of the Supremacy Clause.244 Exceptional Child illustrates 
one overlooked advantage of the judge-made right of action: that 
reliance on such a construct allows the Court to maintain some control 
 
 237. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 160 
(2008) (refusing to recognize an implied right of action); cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
287 (2001) (“Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper 
function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.” (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment))).  
 238. For more on the evolution of the forms of action at common law, see generally BAKER, 
supra note 39. For the Court’s view that judges can tailor congressional rights of action only 
through the use of constitutional, rather than judge-made or prudential, standing limits, see 
generally Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 239. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1392–95 (concluding that, under ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation, the plaintiff was entitled to bring suit under the Lanham Act for false advertising). 
 240. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 241. See generally id. (declining to recognize plaintiffs’ standing to challenge environmental 
consequences overseas without a more concrete connection to the endangered species and 
habitat). 
 242. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). 
 243. See id. at 1384 (explaining that the right to seek relief from preempted state law “is the 
creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, 
tracing back to England”). 
 244. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong, 567 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Indep. 
Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008)), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).  
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over who can sue and in what circumstances, without having to deploy 
constitutional limitations. But that very feature appears inconsistent 
with the Court’s rejection of judge-made prudential standing limits in 
Lexmark.245 
2. The Private/Public Distinction.  The Scottish actio popularis may 
shed new light on a longstanding debate among American scholars as 
to the significance of the private litigation model as distinct from what 
has been variously called the “public action,”246 “public law 
litigation,”247 or “special function” model.248 Views about these models 
differ, of course, but one finds broad agreement about some 
distinguishing considerations. Private rights, the stuff of ordinary 
litigation between individuals, derive from common law and statutory 
entitlements. Parties bring suit to vindicate these rights, seeking 
traditional forms of relief like damages and injunctions. For much of 
the nineteenth century, private law litigation provided the crucial 
testing ground for claims of statutory right as well as the primary 
vehicle for the assertion of constitutional claims, which often arose 
incidentally in the course of litigating private claims. Marbury v. 
Madison249 may typify the category, arising as a mandamus action to 
secure a personal right to judicial office and presenting, as some would 
say, an incidental question as to the constitutionality of a federal law.250 
For the most part, scholars agree that the private rights model of 
litigating constitutional rights has given way to a public rights model, 
but disagree about what that means for the law of standing. Within a 
public rights model, scholars frankly acknowledge the role of the 
 
 245. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 (“Just as a court cannot apply its independent policy 
judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, . . . it cannot limit a cause of 
action that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.”). For a discussion of the 
tension between Exceptional Child and Lexmark, see Henry P. Monaghan, A Cause of Action 
Anyone?: Federal Equity and the Preemption of State Law, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1807, 1821 
(2016). As Monaghan notes, “Despite the current Court’s hostility to implied rights of action, we 
have a longstanding tradition of suits against officers seeking equitable or declaratory relief for 
alleged wrongful conduct.” Id. 
 246. Jaffe, Citizen Litigant, supra note 9, at 1033. 
 247. Chayes, supra note 8, at 1281. 
 248. Monaghan, supra note 49, at 1368–71. 
 249. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 250. See Monaghan, supra note 49, at 1365–67 (describing Marbury, in the nineteenth-century 
mind, as exemplifying the private rights model of constitutional adjudication, and contrasting that 
model with a special-function approach that emphasizes the Court’s role in the law’s exposition); 
cf. Pushaw, supra note 47, at 500–01 (treating Marbury as a public law action in which the Court 
played an expository role in declaring constitutional meaning). 
PFANDER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:12 AM 
1542  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1493 
federal courts and Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication.251 The 
common law forms of action no longer structure litigation, which now 
primarily focuses on the elaboration of public law norms.252 Parties 
assert constitutional claims directly, rather than incidentally, often in 
actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.253 Sovereign 
immunity presents no barrier to the direct assertion of claims against 
governmental bodies, at least as long as the parties name government 
officers as defendants.254 We have become increasingly familiar with 
the judicial enforcement of public or group interests in suits brought by 
“individuals and groups who may or may not be the direct beneficiaries 
of the judgment.”255 
For some observers, the slow erosion of the private rights model 
and the rise of the public action model call for a rethinking of the rules 
of standing. In arguing for relaxed standing rules, Jaffe and Berger both 
emphasize the acceptance of some public actions in English law.256 
Professors Cass Sunstein and Steven Winter have made similar 
arguments.257 Even as early as 1973, Professor Henry Monaghan had 
come to see the transformation as essentially complete. Although 
courts continue to require injury-in-fact or personal interest, following 
the vestiges of the private rights model, Monaghan found that “the 
concept has been so diluted that even the most trivial interest will 
suffice.”258 Coupled with the rise of the class action as a tool of 
constitutional adjudication, Monaghan called for a frank embrace of 
the public rights model and a thorough reconceptualization of the 
various rules governing the right to sue. 
 
 251. See generally Chayes, supra note 8 (discussing the elements of public law litigation). 
 252. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 47, at 476–82 (describing the norm-elaboration role of the 
federal courts in matters governed by federal law); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 74–
75 (describing a “law declaration” model of adjudication). 
 253. For more on the centrality of the action for injunctive and declaratory relief in 
constitutional adjudication, see generally Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the 
Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006).  
 254. See generally Pfander & Dwinnell, supra note 53 (highlighting the Eleventh 
Amendment’s inapplicability to suits against state officials for injunctive and declaratory relief 
and proposing that state courts authorize follow-on actions for money against state governments). 
 255. Monaghan, supra note 49, at 1369 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility 
of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 774 (1972))).  
 256. See generally Berger, supra note 9 (cataloging situations in which those with no injury in 
fact were permitted to bring suit); Jaffe, Standing to Secure, supra note 9 (same). 
 257. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 258. Monaghan, supra note 49, at 1382. 
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Remarkably, practice in the Scottish Court of Session provides a 
window on what such a reconceptualized world might resemble. By the 
eighteenth century, Scottish public law displayed the features that 
Monaghan later identified as hallmarks of the public rights model of 
litigation: a reliance on the declaratory-judgment proceeding to test the 
legality of government action directly, a relaxation of the rules of 
sovereign immunity that enabled the public to interplead directly with 
the Crown by suing its officers, and a rethinking of the rules of standing 
that enabled parties to pursue “public” or “popular” actions in the 
Court of Session. As we have seen, the Scots frankly distinguished 
between “private” actions and public or popular actions. Although title 
and interest fully applied to determine the standing of individuals to 
pursue private claims, the Court of Session did not insist on title and 
interest in connection with certain actio popularis or popular actions.259 
The Scots’ handling of the actio popularis offers a range of 
comparative insights into modern standing law. True, the rights in 
question were not avowedly constitutional in the modern American 
sense. But in many instances, the public was invoking rights held in 
common as a matter of immemorial custom. Thus, the eighteenth-
century authorities tended to recognize the viability of the actio 
popularis to establish a right to allow animals to graze freely on public 
lands, to navigate public streams, and to transport goods along public 
roads.260 In all such instances, the individuals invoking the customary 
right of the commons suffered a diffuse harm that equally affected 
many of their friends and neighbors. Though no particular individual 
necessarily suffered a form of special damage (interest) and though 
none, by definition, “owned” the public right in question (title), a 
declarator action enabled the court to clarify rights for both pursuers 
and defenders.  
The Scots’ willingness to permit such public rights proceedings, 
often by individuals affected by the prospective loss of a public good, 
provides an obvious analog to American environmental-standing 
cases. In the modern environmental-standing case, plaintiffs articulate 
an interest (albeit one held in common with others) in the public good 
 
 259. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 260. 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, supra note 30, at 85–86 (noting that 
the actio popularis was available for seeking a “declarator of a public right of way, a right of 
market, a declarator that the navigation of a public navigable river should not be obstructed, a 
declarator of common use and enjoyment by the public of a piece of land, for removal of a public 
danger, or nuisance, or to prevent the building of a bridge across a public street by proprietors on 
opposite sides of the street, and the like”). 
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of clean air, clean water, pristine public lands, or the preservation of 
endangered species.261 Thus, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,262 the plaintiffs living in the region 
were said to have a “reasonable concern” that factory pollution would 
lessen their willingness to swim downriver from the site or to picnic or 
birdwatch in the area.263 Similar cases abound.264 But the Court has 
refused to recognize the standing of those who lack a personal 
connection to the threatened species or environment or habitat that 
lies at the center of the dispute. Thus, in Lujan, plaintiffs in the United 
States were said to lack the requisite injury for standing purposes 
because they could not show the threat of an imminent loss; they simply 
were too far away from the habitats of the Nile crocodile and the Asian 
elephant to face the concrete injury said to be required.265 This 
requirement of territorial connection calls to mind Kames’s warning in 
Selkirk that the recognition of a public action would mean, at least in 
theory, that “any one person in Scotland” could bring the action.266 One 
way to address this concern with far-flung rights to sue was to define 
the relevant community more narrowly, to include only those pursuers 
who could plausibly claim to have a stake in continued protection of a 
common resource.267 Roman law encourages such selectivity, observing 
 
 261. Economists teach us that public goods display jointness and nonexcludability, in that all 
members of a given society can consume the good and cannot be prevented from doing so. But, 
although some public goods (say, national defense) do not necessarily give rise to a tragedy of the 
commons problem, others do. For example, the unfettered right to dump waste into a river may 
harm the river for other uses. For an overview of the rules of environmental standing, see 
generally Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1998) (noting 
the way in which the Court’s injury-in-fact analysis has tended to focus attention on the human 
dimension of environmental issues). 
 262. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 263. See id. at 183. 
 264. See generally, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1973) (recognizing recreational 
and aesthetic interests as sufficient to confer standing on the members of an environmental group 
who have direct connections to the site in question). 
 265. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992); see also Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009) (concluding that the members’ general practice of regularly 
visiting national parks was insufficient to warrant standing to challenge a forest service action that 
facilitated the sale of timber on specific lands). 
 266. See supra text accompanying note 143.  
 267. See supra text accompanying note 108. In contrast to Kames, MacLaren viewed the right 
to sue as extending to “any member of the community”—which was perhaps a reference not to 
Scotland as a whole but to the community that benefited from the public good at issue. See supra 
text accompanying note 163.  
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that in choosing one plaintiff to pursue an actio popularis, the praetor 
may rely on the relative interest of the parties.268 
The Scots’ practice also includes analogs to the controversial 
citizen or taxpayer suit. In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
largely rejected such proceedings, characterizing them as generalized 
grievances shared in common by all and actionable by none.269 Critics 
of this restriction on taxpayer standing worry that standing law may 
have the effect of shielding from scrutiny practices (such as the transfer 
of government funds to religious organizations) that might well violate 
the Constitution if the Court were to reach the merits.270 But the 
defenders of limits on taxpayer standing observe that some filters 
might be appropriate to limit suits to enforce certain constitutional 
rights, especially those that affect a broad range of people in different 
ways.271 The cases thus invite a debate over the nature of the rights in 
question and the proper role of the federal judiciary.  
 
 268. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. Professor Robert Pushaw argues that chance 
should play a role in the selection process, at least in environmental litigation. See Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing, 
65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 293 (2013) (arguing that an Article III “case” requires a plaintiff to show 
that his federal legal rights have been violated fortuitously, that is, “involuntarily as a result of a 
chance occurrence” beyond his control); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to 
“Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2010) (same).  
 269. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011) (denying taxpayer 
standing to challenge a tax credit that reduced the tax liability of parents whose children attended 
religious schools); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (denying 
taxpayer standing to challenge the executive branch’s discretionary decision to spend money on 
certain faith-based initiatives); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (denying 
citizen standing to challenge the secrecy of the federal budget as it applied to the Central 
Intelligence Agency); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (denying taxpayer 
standing to challenge a congressional appropriation of money); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
103 (1968) (permitting a taxpayer to challenge a federal statute that specifically appropriated 
funds to a religious enterprise).  
 270. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at 160–61 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that taxpayers have the same interest in avoiding the use of public funds for religious purposes, 
regardless of whether the expenditure takes the forms of a direct subsidy or a tax credit); see Hein, 
551 U.S. at 593 (denying taxpayer standing to challenge the executive branch’s decision to use 
appropriated funds for religious purposes). 
 271. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 314 (1979) (arguing that broad standing may 
empower those with a less substantial interest to establish precedents that undercut the rights of 
those more directly concerned); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1663, 1679–83 (2007) (explaining that individuals jointly affected by an apparent constitutional 
violation may prefer to waive their right rather than enforce it, and exploring the threat posed by 
broad-based standing to the effectiveness of such waivers). 
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Similar questions arose in Scotland, although they seem to have 
been resolved in favor of permitting some forms of citizen-suit 
litigation. In Minister of Cambuslang, the interest of the pursuers arose 
from their obligation to support the poor, thereby giving them an 
undivided stake (however small on an individual basis) as taxpayers in 
the amounts withdrawn from the parish poor fund.272 In Herriot’s 
Hospital, the pursuers had no direct interest in the land in question; 
they were members of the community served by the hospital and thus 
had only an indirect interest in its financial well-being.273 In both 
instances, the affairs of the institution were controlled by a board of 
overseers on which the pursuers did not serve. They could thus claim 
at most a kind of general interest in the proper handling of a public 
body’s finances. Still, these generalized grievances were sufficient to 
persuade the Court of Session to allow the actions to proceed. 
Intriguingly, however, the court’s willingness to entertain such 
claims occasioned some of the same sort of criticism that underlies the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to allow generalized grievances. As Kames 
observed in Selkirk, other institutions of government (beside the 
Court) can oversee a local body’s financial affairs. Both the Court of 
Exchequer and the body’s own board members were thought to have 
had the power to conduct such investigations. By permitting the Court 
of Session’s insertion into the oversight process at the behest of anyone 
who chose to sue, the litigation could potentially produce decisions in 
conflict with those of other institutions.274 In any case, the problems 
with informer proceedings throughout Europe suggested to Kames 
that Scotland should embrace them only with legislative 
authorization.275 Justice Harlan adopted essentially the same view two 
hundred years later, when he argued against the judicial recognition of 
the limited form of taxpayer standing upheld in Flast v. Cohen.276 
 
 272. For an overview of Herriot’s Hospital, see supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
Notably, in Frothingham v. Mellon, the Supreme Court confirmed the viability of taxpayer suits 
directed at local institutions, even as it ruled out such suits aimed at national practices that were 
supported by millions of taxpayers. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486. 
 273. See supra notes 137–41. 
 274. As noted above, the Court of Session attempted to moderate the conflict by respecting 
the Court of Exchequer’s primacy in general accounting of local books and by limiting its own 
role to suits brought by individuals to contest specific acts of wrongdoing. See supra note 130.  
 275. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that taxpayer 
standing should be permitted only when authorized by Congress). Reliance on Congress may 
present other problems, however, and may necessitate some leadership on the part of the Court. 
See Fletcher, supra note 42, at 224 (questioning the wisdom of a congressional role in calibrating 
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3. Standing and Nonparty Preclusion.  The Court of Session’s 
efforts to articulate a body of preclusion law in the context of 
evaluating a pursuer’s title and interest to sue also deserve a 
comparative comment or two. The court’s concern with preclusion 
helps to explain why it chose to maintain a body of standing law that 
was separate from the merits. Only a party with title and interest to sue 
could put a particular claim into issue such that the disposition would 
bind both the pursuer and the defender. Otherwise, the defender could 
not invoke the prior decree as a bar to subsequent litigation. Concern 
with preclusion thus explains why the Court of Session regarded the 
matter of standing as a defense that was to be raised at the threshold 
and did not go to the merits of the claim. The separation of preclusion 
and merits was essential if the proper party’s right to sue was to be 
protected.  
The court’s concern with preclusion was not limited to private 
litigation, but also extended to the actio popularis proceeding. As we 
have seen, the court would ascribe preclusive effect to the first public 
action that went to judgment, so long as there was a sufficient 
community of interest between the first pursuers and the second 
pursuers.277 In applying that approach, the court seems to have focused 
on the nature of the interest being asserted in the litigation. Thus, in a 
public action to establish a right of way, the claim on behalf of the 
general public was said to be precluded by earlier litigation brought on 
behalf of the public.278 The practice in Scotland appears at least 
somewhat similar to that in England, where preclusive effect attached 
to the first judgment in informer and relator proceedings and barred 
subsequent actions including those brought by the Crown itself.279 
The Scots’ willingness to consider preclusion in public actions 
opens up a new area of scholarly inquiry. To date, scholarship on the 
law of standing in the United States has largely ignored the subject of 
nonparty preclusion. To be sure, scholars have considered the 
possibility that a plaintiff without a sufficiently concrete stake in the 
matter might fail to press the claim effectively and thus undermine the 
prospects for successful recognition of a new claim or legal right. The 
 
issues of standing to sue for constitutional violations); Pushaw, supra note 47, at 511–12, 524 
(same).  
 277. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. 
 279. On the binding quality of the first informer proceeding, see 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
16, at *160 (treating the verdict in an informer proceeding as a “bar to all others, and conclusive 
even to the king himself,” except in cases of collusion). 
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possibility of such feckless litigation has been viewed as a possible 
justification for the Supreme Court’s insistence on limiting standing to 
those with a genuine stake in the matter.280 Other scholars have 
questioned these concerns, noting that the Court will have the final say 
as to the content of federal law and will doubtless be well informed (by 
the parties’ briefs, amicus briefs, bench memos, and lower court 
decisional law) on the subject.281 For the most part, scholars have 
examined these potential consequences through the lens of stare 
decisis.282 Until recently, no one seems to have taken up the Scots’ 
suggestion that some form of nonparty preclusion should as a general 
matter bar a second proceeding.283 
This gap in standing literature doubtless reflects important 
differences in institutional structure. Because the Court of Session 
acted as a court of original and final jurisdiction in actio popularis 
proceedings, interested parties were likely to have regarded the first 
such proceeding as the main event for obvious reasons. Once the Court 
of Session had decided the issue at the behest of one or more members 
of the public, it was unlikely to reach a different conclusion in a 
subsequent action brought by a different group of pursuers. In this 
sense, then, prior decisional law could ascribe decisive effect to the first 
decision as a practical matter, even if the law of stare decisis did not 
 
 280. See Brilmayer, supra note 271, at 314 (arguing that insufficiently interested litigants may 
fail to pursue claims with the vigor necessary to help shape the law).  
 281. Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1708 (1979) (questioning the premise that interested litigants pursue claims 
more vigorously than ideological litigants and pointing to the range of information from which 
courts draw when fashioning rules of decision).  
 282. See Brilmayer, supra note 271, at 304–06 (emphasizing the role of stare decisis); 
Kontorovich, supra note 271, at 1712 (emphasizing the role of precedent in evaluating standing 
law and noting the inapplicability of issue preclusion); Tushnet, supra note 281, at 1708 (same). 
 283. Professor Lea Brilmayer argues that stare decisis could produce results comparable to 
preclusion. See Brilmayer, supra note 271, at 308–09; see also Kontorovich, supra note 271, at 
1712. But Brilmayer assumes that nonparty preclusion would be inappropriate and argues from 
that premise against the preclusive effects of stare decisis. In an important article on standing, 
Professor Seth Davis explores the connection between standing doctrine in actions on behalf of 
the public and the law of preclusion. See Davis, supra note 46, at 643–44 (concluding that when 
Congress authorizes a private individual to stand for the public, the executive may be precluded 
from any further litigation by the result); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General 
and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 655 (2005) (exploring preclusion principles in 
the context of follow-on litigation of public rights); cf. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 
724 (indicating that an absence of preclusive effect could deprive representative litigation of the 
quality needed to form the basis for a case). 
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compel such effect.284 But the Court of Session’s role as a court of 
original and final jurisdiction differs sharply from the situation in the 
United States, where widely dispersed courts of first instance may 
entertain initial proceedings and the federal government might litigate 
for years without securing a definitive resolution of an issue from the 
Supreme Court.285 
The law of preclusion in the United States has been framed with 
this model of widely dispersed litigation in mind. Sitting atop a 
sprawling federal judiciary, the Supreme Court views its role as 
presiding over the uniform and effective enforcement of federal law; as 
a result, it frequently grants discretionary review to clarify (and unify) 
the law in the face of divisions in lower court authority.286 By all 
accounts, the Court has come to view its task in explicating federal law 
as one that it performs more effectively when it has the benefit of a 
range of lower court authority.287 So long as the Court views divisions 
in lower courts as an important prelude to its own involvement, the law 
of stare decisis and issue preclusion must leave the parties free to 
pursue their legal arguments without regard to prior decisions in other 
circuits. Otherwise, the stare decisis or issue-preclusive effect of the 
first circuit court decision to address a matter would settle it for the 
country as a whole. Such effective settlement would, in turn, place 
some pressure on the Supreme Court to grant immediate review. We 
can thus view both the “law of the circuit” doctrine as it has evolved in 
the lower courts and the rules of nonparty preclusion as outgrowths of 
 
 284. Although stare decisis did not formally apply in Scotland, the Court of Session frequently 
relied on its prior decisions as authoritative resolutions of questions of law. See supra note 75. 
 285. Suits to challenge allegedly unconstitutional state actions will typically be brought in the 
federal district courts of the state in question; appeals typically proceed to the circuit court whose 
jurisdiction encompasses the state. Venue rules require the plaintiff to file suit against federal 
government officials either in the district where defendants reside, where substantial events 
occurred, or where plaintiffs reside. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2012). Venue in the plaintiff’s 
residence creates the prospect of widely dispersed litigation of claims against federal officers, 
although personal jurisdiction defenses may narrow the range of venues, at least in personal-
capacity suits. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014) (refusing to permit a judge on the 
District of Nevada to assert personal jurisdiction over a federal official whose actions primarily 
occurred in Georgia). 
 286. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)–(b) (identifying a conflict of circuit and state court authority on 
issues of federal law as a basis for granting discretionary review). 
 287. For a sophisticated treatment of the Court’s use of discretionary docket control, see 
generally Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (2012). See also Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy 
in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 16–28 (2016) (discussing Supreme Court docket 
control as agenda-setting). 
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the Court’s perception that some percolation of an issue in the lower 
courts should precede its ultimate decision of that issue. 
Not surprisingly, then, the federal law of nonparty preclusion 
favors repeated litigation of the same issues of public law in the lower 
federal courts. For starters, the Supreme Court has made clear that, 
unlike private parties, the federal government cannot be subject to 
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel when it loses an initial contest 
over the meaning of federal law.288 In reaching that conclusion, the 
Court emphasized the geographic breadth of the government’s 
litigation duties and the undesirable institutional consequences that 
would accompany a rule that froze into place the first adverse 
decision.289 More recently, the Court rejected a lower court doctrine of 
“virtual representation” that would have broadened the scope of 
nonparty preclusion beyond traditional categories.290 In Taylor v. 
Sturgell,291 the Court concluded that the friend (and fellow antique 
aircraft enthusiast) of a party who lost an initial Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) suit against the federal government in the 
Tenth Circuit was not barred from pursuing a substantially similar 
claim in the District of Columbia Circuit.292 As a nonparty to the first 
proceeding, the plaintiff in the second action was free to use the same 
lawyer to pursue his own claim for government documents in a 
different forum, where the law of the Tenth Circuit did not apply.293 
Despite these ordinarily applicable rules, which bar nonparty 
preclusion in litigation with the federal government, one can see some 
signs that federal law may follow Scotland’s lead in embracing wider 
nonparty preclusion for certain kinds of public actions. Some federal 
statutory schemes establish a first-to-file or coordination regime for 
citizen suits, thereby allocating litigation priority and lessening the risk 
 
 288. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 155 (1984) (concluding that the government 
was not precluded from relitigating a legal issue that was resolved against it in an earlier 
proceeding with a different party); see also Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, 
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735–53 (1989) 
(addressing the costs and benefits of nonacquiescence by federal administrative agencies after 
courts have rejected their positions in litigation). 
 289. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160–61. 
 290. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 885 (2008) (disapproving of the doctrine of “virtual 
representation”). 
 291. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
 292. See id. at 885. 
 293. See id. at 887–90 (describing the plaintiff’s efforts to avoid the precedential effect of the 
earlier decision in the Tenth Circuit). 
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of duplicative litigation.294 For example, the Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act authorize “any person” to bring suit against a polluter 
to collect civil penalties payable to the Treasury.295 But in deference to 
the government’s primacy in enforcement, both of those statutes 
require citizen suitors to notify the government of their intent to file 
suit; the statutes bar the commencement of the proceeding if a federal 
or state agency “has commenced” and is “diligently” prosecuting a 
related action.296 Similarly, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) 
requires that the government be notified of the commencement of a 
citizen’s action and authorizes the government to sue on behalf of that 
individual if it chooses to do so.297 In the absence of government 
involvement, the FCA gives priority to the first informer suit filed and 
allows only one informer proceeding to be “pending” at any one 
time.298 In these and other instances, Congress has authorized private 
citizens to pursue public actions and has taken steps to assure some 
coordination with government bodies to reduce the burden of 
duplicative litigation. 
Nonparty preclusion would seem to follow naturally from such 
efforts by Congress to coordinate the litigation of public actions. Recall 
that the Taylor Court recognized an exception to its general rule, 
allowing the preclusion of nonparties under “special statutory 
scheme[s]” when the first action was brought “on behalf of the public 
 
 294. Apart from authorizing suit broadly, the statutes require the plaintiff to notify the U.S. 
Department of Justice of the proposed commencement of an action and broadly authorize 
governmental intervention. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)–(c) (2012). 
 295. See id. § 7604(a) (authorizing “any person” to file suit to enforce the Clean Air Act); 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (authorizing the same under the Clean Water Act). 
 296. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (barring the commencement of a private suit under the Clean 
Air Act when the “Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an 
enforcement action); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (barring the same under the Clean Water Act). 
For a description of the statutory scheme, see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2000). 
 297. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012). 
 298. The first-to-file rule of the FCA gives priority to the first person who files a claim and 
bars others from pursuing the same or related claims. See id. (“When a person brings an action 
under this subsection, no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related 
action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”). Although the Supreme Court declined 
to decide the claim-preclusive effects of the first-to-file rule on other, subsequent litigation, see 
Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978–79 (2015), 
it has indicated that the United States must abide by the result of the first disposition, see United 
States ex rel. Eisenstein v. New York, 556 U.S. 928, 936 (2009) (noting that “the United States is 
bound by the judgment in all FCA actions regardless of its participation in the case”). 
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at large.”299 To illustrate the idea, the Court referred to a decision of 
the Alabama Supreme Court which did not obviously control in the 
federal system.300 Nonetheless, Taylor provides some authority in 
support of according nonparty preclusive effect to public actions (at 
least those brought on the government’s behalf with some measure of 
government oversight).301 Certainly the federal courts have ascribed 
nonparty preclusion to prior litigation under the Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act, and FCA by barring some duplicative litigation.302 
Scottish (and indeed Roman) practice teaches us that the prospect 
of nonparty preclusion necessarily invites closer attention to the 
manner in which one selects the individual, group, or agency that will 
pursue claims on behalf of the public. On the one hand, one might 
argue that the regime of nonparty preclusion reduces the threat of 
duplicative litigation and helps to justify some relaxation of standing 
requirements in environmental cases.303 But public actions pose a 
threat both to defendants and to other potential plaintiffs whose rights 
may be undermined or compromised by inadequate representation of 
the public interest. In particular, the possibility of a collusive suit, 
brought to forestall genuine litigation, highlights the need to attend 
 
 299. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895 (citing Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 
804 (1996)). 
 300. See Richards, 517 U.S. at 804 (citing Corprew v. Tallapoosa Cty., 241 Ala. 492, 494 
(1941)). 
 301. See Corprew, 241 Ala. at 493–94 (describing the manner in which the relator action was 
designed to test entitlement to office). 
 302. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, Ltd. P’ship, 646 F.3d 1258, 1271–
72 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act was barred by the state’s 
prior litigation of the alleged environmental violation); Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 
473–74 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the same under the Clean Air Act); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers 
v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 757–65 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding the same under 
the Clean Water Act). In finding preclusion, the decisions proceed on the assumption that the 
state agency, pursuing claims on behalf of the public, actually represented the individuals who 
later filed suits in federal court. See Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d at 1268–69 (holding 
that the state agency acted on behalf of the public in a parens patriae suit); Friends of Milwaukee’s 
Rivers, 382 F.3d at 757 (same). The cases do not address the degree to which prior litigation by 
one member of the public would bar a later action by the government, although the model of 
providing the government with notice and an opportunity to intervene appears to contemplate 
the government’s preclusion. Compare In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the government was in privity with a qui tam relator under the FCA and bound by the 
relator’s unsuccessful suit against a debtor), with United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the government is not bound by a 
relator’s suit when it is dismissed at the pleading stage). 
 303. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 
(2000) (arguing that a somewhat reduced showing of injury was sufficient to support litigation in 
the environmental context). 
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carefully to the identity of the public’s champion and to deny effect to 
judgments (or settlements) obtained after friendly or collusive 
litigation.304 These sorts of worries help to explain the institutional 
preference for public control of public actions, exercised by politically 
responsible government officials who have the resources to pursue 
claims effectively and responsibly.305 Similar worries may support 
arguments for congressional primacy in defining both the right of 
citizens to mount public actions and the preclusive effect accorded to 
such proceedings.306 
If Congress were to take the lead, it might do so by relying to some 
extent on the model of the federal class action.307 As a procedural tool 
for ensuring the plaintiff’s ability to represent the interests of the class 
and for protecting the defendant from duplicative litigation, Rule 23 
works reasonably well.308 Before a class can be certified, Rule 23 calls 
for an assessment of the adequacy of the class representative (and 
attorney), precisely the sort of inquiry Congress might demand before 
 
 304. Under the Clean Water Act, state enforcement proceedings may bar later enforcement 
proceedings only where they have been diligently pursued. See, e.g., id. at 167 (noting that the 
district court refused to treat an apparently collusive settlement between a state agency and 
citizen as a bar to later litigation); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers, 382 F.3d at 757 (emphasizing 
that diligence is key to preclusion). In the courts of England, collusive suits did not bar a 
subsequent action by a genuine adversary to recover an informer’s penalty. See 3 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 16, at *162 (observing that, although the first-filed informer suit had priority, a 
collusive suit would not bar subsequent relitigation). 
 305. See Beck, supra note 41, at 575–85 (describing the problems with informer litigation in 
England); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 701–04, 725–32 (explaining how, after 
problems with the private enforcement of public rights, informer suits came under attack in the 
United States and gave way to a model of public agency enforcement). 
 306. Because the resolution of public claims can affect the rights of both defendants and 
unrepresented plaintiffs, due process may impose limits on Congress’s dispensation. See 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940). See generally Davis, supra note 46, at 619–21 (discussing 
the day-in-court ideal and the interests of unrepresented class members). 
 307. On the particulars of class certification, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For a summary of the 
factors that have made class actions a controversial fixture on the Supreme Court’s docket, see 
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 13–16 
(1996). See also Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1051, 1056–57 (1996) (identifying the reverse auction, universal venue, inadequate representation 
by class counsel, and state court particularism as the problems underlying the calls for reform 
which eventually led to the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
 308. On the preclusive effect of the refusal to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, see Smith v. 
Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 318 (2011). See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class 
Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005) (exploring the many connections between the 
calculus underlying the certification of class actions and the preclusive effect of the court’s later 
judgment). 
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allowing a private party to litigate on behalf of the public as a whole.309 
What’s more, Rule 23 requires the court to review the adequacy of any 
settlement, thus helping to weed out collusive deals.310 Finally, Rule 23 
offers a measure of repose to defendants; win or lose, the judgment in 
a class action bars future litigation of the same claims by adequately 
represented members of the certified class.311 Such an approach would 
implement the key insight of Scots’ law: that standing to pursue public 
actions necessarily entails an analysis of nonmutual preclusion.  
B. Scotland and Standing Law in the United States 
Apart from the particular lessons Scots law can teach about the 
interplay of standing and preclusion, its approach to regulating the 
right to sue may well shed comparative light on the origins of standing 
law in the United States. One view holds that the Supreme Court 
during the New Deal era essentially invented the doctrine. Thus, Judge 
William Fletcher has traced the creation of a “separately articulated 
and self-conscious law of standing” to the “growth of the 
administrative state” and an increase in litigation aimed at 
“articulat[ing] and enforc[ing] public, primarily constitutional, 
values.”312 Winter similarly finds that the law of standing was fashioned 
in the twentieth century “largely through the conscious efforts of 
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter.”313 Such leading scholars as Cass 
Sunstein, Robert Pushaw, and Evan Lee also attribute standing law to 
 
 309. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring the court to ascertain if the class representative will 
adequately represent the class, assert claims that are typical of those of the other class members, 
and press the claims on behalf of the interests of the class without any conflict of interest). See 
generally Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring More Than Merely 
“Adequate” Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 958–62 (2004) (cataloging factors 
that inform adequacy of representation and including the quality and experience of class counsel). 
This more searching inquiry into representational adequacy would seem appropriate in 
circumstances where nonmutual preclusive effect attaches to the judgment in a public action. 
 310. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring courts to evaluate the fairness of any proposed 
settlement). See generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (rejecting the proposed 
class action settlement). 
 311. Of course, the key to repose lies in the adequacy of representation, a concept rooted in 
due process. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1940) (permitting a class member to attack 
a prior class action decree in which class conflicts precluded adequate representation); Patrick 
Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 383, 432–40 (2000) (supporting the use of collateral attack to ensure fair treatment 
of class members). 
 312. Fletcher, supra note 42, at 225; cf. JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF 
AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 55 (1978) (observing that the term “standing” entered into common usage 
in the twentieth century). 
 313. Winter, supra note 10, at 1374. 
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the evolving demands of the twentieth century rather than to anything 
inherent in Founding-era conceptions of the judicial power.314 
Other scholars find greater continuity with the past. Woolhandler 
and Nelson, for example, find substantial support in history for the 
emergence of standing doctrine.315 Looking mainly to English sources 
and developments in the courts of the United States, Woolhandler and 
Nelson identify a variety of standing-like limits on the judicial power 
of the federal courts dating from the nineteenth century. On their 
telling, not only did American courts mainly decline to hear public 
actions and other forms of relator or informer litigation, but the 
Supreme Court also suggested that at least some of the relevant 
standing limits were of a constitutional dimension.316 Woolhandler and 
Nelson thus defend the idea that private litigation, with attendant 
limits, provides the model for federal adjudication. And they question 
the degree to which the recognition of certain homegrown exceptions, 
such as mandamus, prohibition, and relator litigation, establishes a 
general principle that Congress is free to permit private plaintiffs to 
enforce public rights. In their view, public rights are the province of 
government enforcement, and the Court properly declines to allow 
private citizens to perform this enforcement function.317 
The experience of the Court of Session introduces new ideas to 
the debate over standing’s origins and legitimacy as constitutional law. 
The Scots held fast to the requirements of title and interest to sue in 
private litigation, even as they embraced some forms of public law 
litigation.318 The Scots’ experience thus provides some support for both 
sides of the standing debate. Title and interest appear to derive from 
civil law ideas and bear some resemblance to the constructs (more 
familiar to scholars in the United States) of injuria and damnum.319 The 
notion that courts sit to hear claims of right that implicate the 
pecuniary or other legally recognized interests of private claimants has 
roots deep in the Western conception of a tribunal of justice and 
provides a natural foundation for the doctrine of standing.320 
 
 314. See Lee, supra note 11, at 625; Pushaw, supra note 11, at 458–63; Sunstein, supra note 10, 
at 176. 
 315. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 690–92. 
 316. Id. at 718–21. 
 317. Id. at 723–25. 
 318. See supra Part I.B. 
 319. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 719 n.146. 
 320. By characterizing the essential feature of the plaintiff’s complaint as a claim of right, I 
am rather self-consciously declining to frame the problem of justiciability in terms of the presence 
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At the same time, the Court of Session’s recognition of the 
Roman-law actio popularis or public action provides strong support for 
those who argue that rigid adherence to the private model of standing 
too narrowly limits the enforcement of commonly held rights.321 The 
Court of Session seems to have made a practical judgment in allowing 
such actions to proceed over the objections of those like Kames who 
contended that alternative remedies were sufficient. As the court 
explained in Herriot’s Hospital, the current magistrates were unlikely 
to hold their predecessors to account and were unlikely to do so in a 
way that would prevent the loss of a valuable property. Oversight by 
the Court of Exchequer, though proper to ensure review of public 
accounts, could not address specific instances of official malfeasance.322 
Hence the necessity for the recognition of a public action—otherwise, 
there was too great a risk of a failure of justice. 
The intermediate approach apparently adopted in Scotland allows 
for a somewhat more nuanced assessment of the fortunes of bounty-
driven public actions in England and the United States. Woolhandler 
and Nelson accurately report that bounty-driven public actions had 
grown controversial, in part due to the incentive effects that bounties 
created for the excessive and sometimes scurrilous enforcement of 
penalty statutes.323 Similar concerns led Kames to criticize the public 
action in Scotland and to argue that it should be limited to claims 
brought pursuant to an act of Parliament.324 Woolhandler and Nelson 
conclude, sensibly enough, that the historical criticism of bounty-
driven informer actions makes qui tam litigation a less appealing 
 
of a live dispute between opposing parties. A substantial body of evidence supports the conclusion 
that a claim based on federal law, even an uncontested petition for naturalized citizenship, is 
sufficient to bring the judicial power of the United States into play, at least in cases arising under 
federal law. See Pfander & Birk, Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 1359–91 
(describing the wide range of instances in which Congress has assigned the federal courts 
jurisdiction over uncontested applications to register claims of right). 
 321. See supra note 10 (collecting authority). 
 322. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. For an argument that the Supreme Court 
should administer a body of standing law that allows individuals to pursue commonly held 
constitutional claims, see Pushaw, supra note 11, at 485. Pushaw thus urges the Court to abandon 
its individualized injury standard as applied to alleged government violations of constitutional 
provisions that either protect collective rights (such as the Establishment Clause) or structure the 
government (such as Articles I and II, including provisions like the Incompatibility Clause and 
the Ineligibility Clause). Id. at 487–89.  
 323. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 725–32.  
 324. See Lang v. Magistrates of Selkirk (1748) ScotCS, in KAMES, supra note 143, at 184 
(arguing that Scotland should follow Europe in laying aside the actio popularis except as “directed 
by particular statutes”). 
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foundation on which to predicate modern arguments for reliance on 
private litigants to enforce public duties.325 But the Scots’ intermediate 
approach reveals that a legal system can curtail bounty-hunter actions, 
while retaining a different form of the actio popularis to allow 
individuals to enforce commonly held public rights against public 
bodies. The selective practice of the Court of Session offers a modern 
justification for the public action that the bounty-hunter problems do 
not undercut. 
The experience in Scotland may also offer new insights into the 
rise of the standing doctrine in the United States. The Court of Session 
in the eighteenth century enjoyed broad equitable power. It could issue 
declaratory judgments at the behest of any litigant who sought a 
clarification of her legal rights, and it could entertain suits that 
challenged the legality of government action. Because each of these 
elements of practice were implicated in the decision of the Court of 
Session to recognize the right of private individuals to enforce public 
rights, they helped to shape the role of the court in actio popularis 
proceedings. Similar factors may have spurred the development of 
standing law in the United States, as part of the shift from private law 
to public law litigation326 that, in the oft-quoted words of Justice 
Frankfurter, transformed the federal courts into “powerful reliances 
for vindicating every [federal] right.”327  
Recognition of the officer suit, coupled with general federal 
question jurisdiction, played a crucial role in the rise of standing law. 
Ex parte Young recognized that suits against officers did not run afoul 
of the Eleventh Amendment and did not require separate 
congressional authorization in the form of a federal statute expressly 
conferring a right to sue.328 The decision thus opened the door to 
 
 325. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 13, at 725–32. 
 326. As noted in the Introduction, the federal courts were given a general grant of federal 
question jurisdiction in 1875, and they gained the power to enjoin government officials from 
committing ongoing violations of federal constitutional law in Ex parte Young, in 1908. See supra 
note 53. Additionally, the federal courts were empowered to entertain declaratory-judgment 
proceedings in 1934. See Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-343, 48 Stat 955 (1934) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012)).  
 327. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES 
M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928)). See generally Monaghan, supra 
note 49, at 1368–71 (emphasizing these elements of federal judicial authority as defining the 
special function or public law model of law declaration). 
 328. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908). The decision has been conventionally 
understood to establish two principles, that the railroad has a right to sue to enjoin the state 
attorney general in his official capacity from enforcing unconstitutional rates and that such an 
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actions in equity brought to challenge government action taken by both 
state and federal officials.329 Much of the early litigation in which the 
Court struggled with standing doctrine arose in connection with open-
ended applications for injunctions against allegedly unlawful or 
unconstitutional government actions. In Frothingham v. Mellon,330 an 
individual taxpayer sought to enjoin federal expenditures under a 
federal spending statute that was said to violate the Tenth 
Amendment;331 in Fairchild v. Hughes,332 the plaintiff brought a bill in 
equity to block the implementation of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
which gave women the vote.333 Both cases involved suits to address 
what the Court described as the “right, possessed by every citizen, to 
require that the government be administered according to law.”334 In 
both cases, the Supreme Court declined to permit the action to 
proceed. 
Scholars agree that these decisions played a central role in the 
eventual formulation of modern standing law.335 But they disagree as 
to when the Court formally constitutionalized the law of standing and 
what causative factors played a role in the decision to do so. Winter 
contends that Frothingham laid the foundation for a body of 
constitutional law that came later and identifies a variety of factors as 
elements in the transition, including judicial ideology and the power of 
metaphor.336 Bellia argues that the promulgation of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in 1938 may have hastened the arrival of standing 
law, as litigants shifted away from the common law forms of pleading 
to embrace the idea of a claim for relief under applicable law.337 Under 
this more open-ended pleading regime, Bellia argues, the forms of 
 
officer suit does not violate the Eleventh Amendment as one against the state. See FALLON ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 927. 
 329. For applications of Ex parte Young to federal officers, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 892. 
 330. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 331. Id. at 479–80. 
 332. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
 333. Id. at 127. 
 334. Id. at 129. 
 335. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 10, at 1443–47 (discussing Fairchild and Frothingham at some 
length).  
 336. See id. at 1444–47 (comparing the Court’s reasoning in Frothingham to “the modern 
doctrine of standing”). 
 337. See Bellia, supra note 49, at 825–27 (“Standing did not emerge as a question distinct from 
whether the plaintiff had a cause of action under a recognized form of proceeding until the merger 
of law and equity in the federal system and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”). 
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action could no longer perform their traditional office in restricting 
recovery to plaintiffs who had articulated recognized forms of legal 
injury.338 
True enough, but the pressure to articulate rules of standing may 
have come earlier still. Although it remains a topic of frequent 
exploration, most scholars agree that Ex parte Young broadened the 
scope of relief available for threatened constitutional violations by 
government officials.339 While past decisions had allowed suits to enjoin 
threatened invasions of property rights,340 the action recognized in Ex 
parte Young allowed a suit to block the non-tortious enforcement of 
state law. The decision thus broadened the scope of federal judicial 
intervention to encompass a new category of constitutional violations 
and thus went beyond the traditional role of courts of equity in granting 
antisuit injunctions.341 After Ex parte Young, litigants began to mount 
direct, affirmative constitutional claims by relying on the officer suit 
model that the Court had confirmed there. Only two years later, in 
1910, a senator from North Carolina reported with some misgivings 
that there had already been “150 cases of this kind . . . where one 
 
 338. See id. at 826 (“[W]hile before the merger of law and equity the question of standing was 
indistinct from the question whether the plaintiff had a recognized cause of action for a judicial 
remedy, there were significant limitations on the forms of proceeding (and, thus, causes of action) 
that were available to non-injured-in-fact persons.”). 
 339. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 927 (noting that the decision recognized a new 
right to sue for injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment in circumstances in which state 
officials’ expected conduct was likely not tortious at common law, thus opening up a new field for 
federal judicial intervention); cf. Monaghan, supra note 245, at 1826–30 (inclining toward an 
account of Ex parte Young that emphasizes federal equity, rather than the Constitution, as the 
source of the right to sue). 
 340. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (permitting the bank to seek an 
injunction against state officers’ trespassory taking of bank assets).  
 341. One scholar argues that Ex parte Young can be explained as doing little more than 
updating an old standard, the antisuit injunction. See generally John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2010) (arguing that Ex parte Young does not recognize an implied right of 
action but rather relies on an established and limited corollary to the antisuit injunction). But Ex 
parte Young did not fit within the antisuit category; it was an action to restrain a criminal 
prosecution (thus falling outside equity’s concurrent jurisdiction) and it did not address the 
established categories of antisuit interposition: fraud, mistake, and accident. See 1 POMEROY, 
supra note 205, §§ 139–40, at 191–94 (identifying the courts’ refusal to recognize defenses of fraud, 
mistake and accident as the cornerstone of equity’s perception that law’s remedial inadequacy 
necessitated the antisuit injunction); 2 STORY, supra note 205, § 1198, at 562 (affirming that not 
every defense would support an antisuit action in equity but only those based on fraud, mistake, 
and accident, where the court of law does not recognize the defense). Instead, Ex parte Young 
was apparently regarded (in keeping with the conventional wisdom) as opening up a new field of 
equitable intervention to restrain threatened constitutional violations. See generally Pfander & 
Dwinnell, supra note 254, at 211–14 (criticizing Harrison’s account as inconsistent with 
contemporary conceptions of the antisuit injunction). 
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Federal judge had tied the hands of the state officers, the governor, and 
the attorney general.”342 
As members of Congress pressed for legislation to restrict the Ex 
parte Young remedy,343 the Court felt some pressure to adopt limiting 
measures of its own. One can see in Fairchild, as early as 1922, an effort 
on the Court’s part to give voice to constitutional concerns with the 
potential breadth of unbounded injunctive relief. There, the Court 
specifically found that, although the bill sought equitable relief to 
compel the government to administer its affairs in accordance with law, 
it was “not a case within the meaning of § 2 of Article III of the 
Constitution.”344 Forced to confront the model of litigation it had 
recognized in Ex parte Young, the Fairchild Court seems to have 
undertaken a search for a set of limits on the power of the individual 
to challenge government action by citizen suit. That it felt moved to 
articulate constitutional limits may reflect the fact that the Ex parte 
Young Court had treated the Constitution as a key factor in its 
recognition of the right to sue. 
C. On the Need for a Threshold Body of Standing Law 
Apart from the Scots’ embrace of a public–private distinction in 
defining standing to sue, the Scottish experience explains how a 
concern with preclusion translates into the use of standing law as a 
threshold, non-merits test of the viability of particular claims and 
claimants. Some form of threshold inquiry enables the defender to 
contest title and interest and thereby ensure that any favorable decree 
effectively shields the defender from a second or third round of 
litigation. While the threat of such duplicative litigation in the private 
law context must have been negligible, the threat was far more real in 
the context of public actions. There, many pursuers could bring an 
 
 342. Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex parte Young, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 247, 270 
(Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (quoting Senator Overman). 
 343. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 3, at 1089 (describing various legislative responses to Ex 
parte Young’s storm of controversy). 
 344. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). The Court’s constitutional intentions can 
be seen both in its reference to the text of Article III and in its reliance on In re Pacific Railway 
Commission, 32 F. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887), which was perhaps the earliest indication that the terms 
“cases” and “controversies” have similar meanings and impose limits on the federal judicial 
power. For a discussion of the significance and novelty of Pacific Railway Commission, see 
Pfander & Birk, Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 1421–22. For a similar conclusion 
as to the constitutional basis of the decision, see EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN 
AMERICA: HOW THE AGELESS WISDOM OF THE FEDERAL COURTS WAS INVENTED 40–41 
(2011). 
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action to assert the same claim of right, threatening the defender with 
a string of suits. A threshold inquiry into title and interest, coupled with 
the extension of preclusive effect to the decree in the first such public 
action, would obviate the threat of endless relitigation. Meanwhile, the 
merits would remain open to resolution in a subsequent action if the 
initial pursuer was said to lack the requisite title and interest to 
pursue.345 
The prospect of downstream preclusion, particularly in public 
actions, provides a possible justification (so far missing from the legal 
literature) for distinguishing the inquiry into standing from that into 
the merits. If, as some scholars have suggested, the Supreme Court 
were to treat the standing inquiry as part of an assessment of whether 
the plaintiff has a claim for relief under the applicable law,346 then a 
refusal to permit a particular plaintiff to sue would represent a merits-
based disposition to which preclusive effect would ordinarily attach.347 
To be sure, under the general rules of nonparty preclusion in the 
United States, such an individual merits determination would have no 
impact on the ability of other plaintiffs to mount their own claims.348 
But if preclusion law in public actions were to evolve along the lines 
suggested by the Scottish example, nonparty preclusive effect could 
conceivably attach to the first public action that proceeded to a 
judgment on the merits. To the extent that such an initial disposition is 
based on the first pursuer’s representational inadequacy, a merits-
based conception of the denial of standing could prevent a more 
adequate representative from later mounting her own claim. In 
situations where nonparty preclusion could result, we might do well to 
 
 345. For authority supporting the ideas explored in this paragraph, see sources cited supra 
Part II.A.3. 
 346. See Currie, supra note 208, at 41 (arguing that the right to sue should be derived from 
the “constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 500 (1975))); Fletcher, supra note 42, at 239 (“The essence of a standing inquiry is thus 
the meaning of the specific statutory or constitutional provision upon which the plaintiff relies 
rather than a disembodied and abstract application of general principles of standing law.”). 
 347. Under modern procedural systems, with liberal rules for the amendment of complaints, 
preclusive effect ordinarily attaches to a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted. See Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that an order of 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, which does not specify that dismissal is without prejudice, “is 
res judicata as to the existing claim”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. d (AM. 
LAW INST. 1982).  
 348. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 885 (2008) (allowing a plaintiff to proceed with his 
claim, despite the fact that his friend had previously unsuccessfully attempted to bring a very 
similar claim). 
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maintain a distinction between the inquiry into standing or 
representational adequacy and the merits of the claim. 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of preclusion and 
representational adequacy in the context of class action litigation 
brings these lessons home. In Smith v. Bayer Corp.,349 the Court held 
that a federal court’s refusal to certify a class did not preclude absentee 
members of the putative class from later seeking certification of the 
same class in a different forum.350 As the Court explained, “only parties 
can be bound by prior judgments,” except in special situations.351 But 
absentee class members do not become parties to a class action until 
the representational adequacy of the named plaintiff has been 
confirmed and the class has been certified; denial of certification, by 
definition, means that the absentees remain nonparties, free to pursue 
a remedy on their own behalf for a violation of their rights.352 
Otherwise, as the Court explained, preclusion would create a regime 
of virtual representation of nonparties comparable to that it had 
rejected in Taylor v. Sturgell.353 The lesson seems entirely 
straightforward: downstream preclusion of public claims calls for an 
upstream assessment of representational adequacy or standing, a 
lesson that the Scottish Court of Session learned in the course of 
assessing title and interest to sue in public actions.  
CONCLUSION 
Facing a series of challenges in the eighteenth century that the 
courts of the United States would not fully confront for several 
decades, the Scottish Court of Session constructed a body of public law 
that included broad power to entertain public actions for declaratory 
relief against government actors. The Court of Session’s response 
anticipated that of the Supreme Court: it required title and interest to 
pursue private litigation even as it relaxed those rules to permit some 
public actions to proceed. One of the public actions, the actio popularis, 
persisted despite criticisms of its potentially expansive scope. 
Reflecting the Court of Session’s perceived obligations as a court of 
equity, it enabled the court to provide a remedy for threatened 
 
 349. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
 350. Id. at 302. 
 351. Id. at 313. 
 352. Id. at 312–15. 
 353. Id. at 315 (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 885). For a discussion of this aspect of Taylor, see 
supra Part II.A.3. 
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violations of law that might otherwise have evaded effective judicial 
oversight. The same qualified impulse toward ensuring a forum for 
claims of illegality underlies the Supreme Court’s struggle with modern 
citizen suits and taxpayer actions.  
A source of surprising insights, the Scots’ experience with the actio 
popularis provides a variety of lessons. For starters, standing issues 
have a timeless quality as high courts struggle to articulate limits on an 
otherwise boundless jurisdiction. That struggle began in earnest in the 
United States after Ex parte Young, and it continues to this day. What’s 
more, the Scots’ concern with repose and preclusion helps to explain 
the need for a threshold, non-merits (but not necessarily jurisdictional) 
inquiry into the pursuer’s right to sue. In the United States, the 
connection between standing and nonparty preclusion has been 
obscured by an institutional reluctance, as restated in Taylor v. Sturgell, 
to restrict an individual’s right to sue. But one can see the connection 
in federal laws that authorize or restrict citizen-suit litigation by 
ascribing nonmutual preclusive effect to denials of the claims of the 
first individual suitor.  
True, the Scots’ approach to standing law does not appear to have 
shaped developments in the United States. But we may still have 
something to learn from the balanced approach that the Court of 
Session adopted. Drawing from Roman law, the court relaxed the 
strictures of title and interest to sue in order to recognize the actio 
popularis. It did so over the objections of one of the great jurists of the 
eighteenth century, Kames, who would have limited standing to those 
with a “lucrative” interest.354 Some two centuries later, Justice Scalia 
put forward a strikingly similar objection to taxpayer standing in the 
United States, proposing to limit standing to those with “Wallet 
Injury.”355 One can learn much about the timeless quality of the 
challenges posed by public law litigation by considering the similarity 
of the Kames and Scalia objections. One can also learn much from the 
decision of their respective peers to reject the Kames and Scalia view. 
The Scottish version of the actio popularis and the American version 
of the public action rest on a shared perception that private suitors with 
no distinctive injury can sometimes play an indispensable role in 
clarifying the legal obligations of public institutions. 
 
 354. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
